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The contribution of this research is three-fold. The first is a method of converting 
the area occupied by a circuit implemented on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) 
to an equivalent (memory included) as a measure of total gate count. This allows direct 
comparison between two FPGA implementations independent of the manufacturer or 
chip family. The second contribution improves the performance of the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) on an 8-bit computing platform. This research develops an 
AES design that occupies less than three quarters of the area reported by the smallest 
design in current literature as well as significantly increases area efficiency. The third 
contribution of this research is an examination of how various designs for the critical 
AES SubBytes and MixColumns transformations interact and affect the overall 
performance of AES. The transformations responsible for the largest variance in 
performance are identified and the effect is measured in terms of throughput, area 
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IMPLEMENTATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE ADVANCED 
ENCRYPTION STANDARD ALGORITHM ON AN 8-BIT FIELD 
PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY HARDWARE PLATFORM 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This research implements the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm on an FPGA device and 
develops three designs for each of the AES transformations SubBytes and MixColumns. 
The results of this research can be used in areas such as onboard encryption of satellite 
communication. Most satellites being launched into orbit today are equipped with 
FPGAs. This allows controllers on the ground to change the configuration of electronic 
hardware on the satellite without having physical contact with the satellite. The amount 
of hardware a satellite can carry is limited but the need for high throughput remains the 
same. Achieving high area efficiency balances the amount of hardware the satellite must 
carry, while maintaining a reasonably high throughput. 
Nine AES designs account for the various combinations of SubBytes and 
MixColumns designs. These designs use the Daemen and Rijmen’s Rijndael algorithm 
targeting an 8-bit platform as a baseline [DaR98]. Each change to the baseline is an 
attempt to increase the throughput of the AES algorithm while decreasing the total area 




1.2 Research Goals and Hypothesis 
This research has two primary goals. The first is to improve the speed of the AES 
algorithm on an 8-bit platform while reducing the chip area of the implementation. This 
goal is met when a design is produced that has a better performance than the baseline 
implementation. The second goal of this research is to determine the effect of factor 
interaction on the speed and space required to implement AES. This goal directly 
supports the hypothesis to be tested. By using modular inversion in an extended field and 
composite modular inversion in a subfield during the transformation of SubBytes in lieu 
of a full look up table; and by utilizing a bitwise shift and combinational logic in the 
transformation of MixColumns, the performance of AES and can be improved to a level 
that surpasses AES performance relative to a baseline level.  
The approach used to satisfy the two goals uses various SubBytes and 
MixColumns designs to analyze the performance based on the three metrics and 
compares the results to the baseline algorithm as well as other optimized designs 
including Caltagirone’s fully pipelined architecture and Good’s compact Xilinx Spartan 
implementation [CaA03][GoB05]. 
The performance of AES on 8-bit processing platforms is an important issue in 
the AES design because most smart cards have such processors and many cryptographic 
applications run on smart cards [DaR98]. Tailoring a compact AES design specifically 
for an 8-bit platform would increase the overall usefulness of the algorithm. This compact 




1.3 Document Overview 
Chapter II presents an overview of the mathematical foundation of AES and 
introduces the original design of the algorithm targeted to an 8-bit processing platform. 
This chapter also reviews current research into AES implementations on FPGAs. Chapter 
III defines the experiment conducted in this research. Chapter IV presents and interprets 
the data collected from the experiment. The goal of Chapter IV is to answer the 
investigative research questions posed in Chapter III: (1) how do experimental factors 
interact and affect the overall performance metrics, and (2) how does each SubBytes and 
MixColumns design affect performance? Chapter V summarizes the conclusions drawn 
from the analysis of experimental data in Chapter IV. This chapter also highlights the 
significance of this work and its impact on current research methods involving the 






II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the mathematics behind AES and presents 
the design specified by the creators of the algorithm targeted to an 8-bit processing 
platform. This chapter also provides a review of current research into AES 
implementations on FPGAs. 
2.2 Description 
Implementing encryption algorithms on an FPGA brings many advantages such as 
flexibility of re-design, run-time reconfiguration, and a vast amount of logic on a single 
chip. The major drawback of an FPGA implementation is reduced throughput compared 
to an equivalent AISC implementation. Through the use of a Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGA 
and Xilinx ISE software, nine different designs of the AES algorithm are created with the 
ultimate goal of reducing the total equivalent gate count while increasing area efficiency.  
On 2 October, 2000, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
announced that the Rijndael algorithm would be adopted as the Advanced Encryption 
Standard [ZCN04]. Rijndael is a block cipher with a variable block and key length. The 
block length and key length can be independently specified to be any integer multiple of 
32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits and a maximum of 256 bits. The AES algorithm 
adopted by NIST is the unmodified Rijndael cipher except that AES has a fixed block 
length of 128 bits and only supports key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bits [DaR98]. This 
research considers AES designs with a key length of 128 bits. 
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2.3 Necessary Mathematical Background 
A grasp of the mathematics behind the Advanced Encryption Standard is 
necessary to understand the algorithm’s design [DaR98].  AES utilizes the nonlinear 
properties of abstract algebra to encrypt input data; consequently, a condensed discussion 
in finite fields and how they are represented is presented before discussing design options 
that optimize the AES algorithm.  
2.3.1 Finite Fields 
In abstract algebra, a field is an algebraic structure where the operations of 
addition, subtraction, multiplication and division (except by zero) may be defined, and 
the same rules from the arithmetic of ordinary numbers hold [Wik07b]. A finite field, or 
Galois field, is a field that contains a finite number of elements. The number of elements 
in a set defined as a finite field is termed the order of that field. A field with order m 
exists iff m is a prime power. A prime power is any integer m for which m=pn for some 
integer n and some prime integer p. The characteristic of a finite field is defined as p. All 
finite fields used in AES have a characteristic of 2 [DaR98]. Finite fields with the same 
order are isomorphic. Since only prime powers are considered for the AES algorithm, for 
each prime power there is only one finite field denoted by GF(pn).  Rijmen and Daemen 
provide intuitive examples of finite fields of prime order p. The elements of a prime order 
finite field GF(p) can be represented by the integers 0, 1, …, p-1. The two operations of 
the field are integer addition modulo p and integer multiplication modulo p [DaR98]. 
Example 1 illustrates these properties. 
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Example 1. In the field GF(2) The elements of the field are 0 and 1; therefore the 
two operations of the field are defined as integer addition modulo 2 and integer 
multiplication modulo 2. The following truth tables define the operations of 
addition and multiplication in the field GF(2) 
   
Table 1. Truth Table for Addition in GF(2) 
 A B A + B 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 




Table 2. Truth Table for Multiplication in GF(2) 
 A B A · B 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
1 0 0 




Finite fields with an order that is not prime excludes the premise that addition and 
multiplication can occur by simple addition and multiplication of integers modulo a 
number [DaR98]. This results in a more complex representation of elements. AES chose 
to represent finite fields GF(pn), with n > 1, by means of polynomials over GF(p) because 
it provides an easy method of converting complex polynomials into binary strings, which 
make implementations of the algorithm much more manageable.  
The transformation of a polynomial residing in a finite field F into a binary string 
begins with the following expression for a polynomial of the form 
b(x)=bn-1 xn-1+bn-2 xn-2+…+b2 x2+b1 x+b0    (1) 
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where x is the indeterminate of the polynomial and bi in the field F are the coefficients 
[DaR98]. Since all finite fields used in AES have a characteristic of 2, the coefficients, bi, 
can only be represented by 2 numbers; in the case of AES those numbers are 0 and 1.  
It is helpful to work out definitions of important terms and symbols the designers 
of AES use throughout the algorithm. First, the degree of a polynomial equals l if bj = 0, 
j > l, and l is the smallest number with that property [DaR98]. In other words, the 
degree of a polynomial is equal to the largest power of x. The set of polynomials over a 
field F is denoted by F[x]. Finally, The set of polynomials over a field F, which have a 
degree below l, is denoted by F[x]| 
∀
l  [DaR98]. 
It is important to note that these polynomials are abstract entities in that they are 
never evaluated. The elements of a finite field are represented as polynomials to simplify 
storing the coefficients in computer memory as well as to increase the mathematical 
complexity of the algorithm (it is much more difficult to find the modulus of a 
polynomial than it is to find the modulus of an integer). For the purposes of AES, the 
coefficients of the polynomials are stored in computer memory as a string. Examples 2 
and 3 demonstrate how polynomials are converted to strings of bits and vice versa. 
Example 2 Let the field F be GF(2), and let l = 8. The polynomials can be stored  
 
as 8-bit values, or bytes [DaR98] 
 
 b(x) → b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0.     (2) 
The reverse holds true as well. A byte can be considered as a polynomial with 
coefficients in GF(2) 
b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0 → b(x), or       (3) 
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b(x) →  b7 x7 + b6 x6 + b5 x5+ b4 x4 + b3 x3 + b2 x2 + b1 x + b0.  (4) 
Example 3. The following table shows polynomials in GF(2)| 8, their  
 
corresponding bit string, and that bit string’s hexadecimal value. 
 
Table 3. Examples of Representing Polynomials in GF(2)| 8
Polynomial Bit string Hexadecimal value 
x6 + x4 + x2+ x + 1 01010111 57 
x7 + x6 + x5+ x4 + x3 + x2 + x + 1 11111111 FF 
x2 + 1 00000101 05 
x7 + x5 + x3 + x 10101010 AA 
 
2.3.2 Finite Field Arithmetic 
AES uses only two operations on polynomials in a finite field: addition and 
multiplication. The addition of polynomials consists of summing the coefficients with 
equal powers of x, where the summing of the coefficients occurs in the underlying field F 
[DaR98]. Since AES operates in a finite field with a characteristic of 2, the summing of 
coefficients in the underlying field is equal to summing the coefficients modulo 2, which 
is also the equivalent of using an XOR.  
Example 4. Evaluate the following expression in GF(2n) (the notation GF(2n) 
indicates that the problem is to be solved in a finite field with an order that is not 
prime and has a characteristic of 2) 
Polynomial representation: 




 Binary representation: 
  {01100111} + {10101010} 
 Hexadecimal representation: 
  {67} + {AA} 
 Solution 
According to the definition of the addition of polynomials in a finite field above, 
the solution can be found by simply applying an XOR (denoted as ) to the 




x7 + x6 + (1 ⊕  1) x5 + x3 + x2 + (1 ⊕  1) x + 1 
 = x7 + x6 + x3 + x2 + 1 
 Binary: 
      01100111 
  ⊕10101010 
      11001101 
 Hexadecimal: 
  {67} + {AA} = {CD} 
  The operation of addition in a finite field with a characteristic of 2 can be 
implemented using an XOR operator; multiplication in a finite field will prove much 
more complex. Multiplication of polynomials in a finite field has much of the same 
properties of ordinary polynomial multiplication. These properties are the associative, 
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commutative, and distributive property with respect to addition of polynomials [DaR98]. 
Since the underlying property of a finite field is that it is a closed set (finite number of 
elements), the multiplication of two elements in a finite field must yield another element 
of that field. This property is not intuitive because usually the magnitude of the product 
of two numbers is not less than the magnitude of the two numbers originally multiplied 
(i.e., 6 x 7 = 1 ?!). To make the multiplication closed over F[x]| l a polynomial of degree l 
called the reduction polynomial [DaR98]. The reduction polynomial for all byte 
multiplications will be designated throughout this document as m(x). The designers of 
AES selected the following polynomial as the reduction polynomial for all 8-bit 
multiplications throughout AES [DaR98]. 
m(x) = x8+ x4 + x3+ x + 1    (5) 
This polynomial’s corresponding bit string is 100011011. Therefore all multiplications in 
the Rijndael field are defined as  
c(x) = a(x) · b(x) ↔ c(x) ≡ (a(x) x b(x) ) mod m(x) [DaR98].  (6) 
This reducing polynomial is not an arbitrary choice for it displays a characteristic known 
as irreducibility. According the Daemen and Rijmen, a polynomial d(x)  is considered 
irreducible over the field GF(p) iff there are no two polynomials a(x) and b(x) with 
coefficients in GF(p) such that d(x) = a(x) ·  b(x). Since the reduction polynomial is itself 
irreducible, it effectively constructs a representation for the field GF(28), which is known 
as the Rijndael field. In AES, all bytes are considered elements of GF(28). All subsequent 
operations on bytes are defined as operations in GF(28) [DaR98]. The following example 
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illustrates how the reduction polynomial is used during polynomial multiplication in a 
finite field. 
Example 5. Evaluate the following expression for byte multiplication in the  
 
Rijndael finite field: 
 
{11110011} · {00110100}  
or in hexadecimal, {F9} · {34} 
 Solution 




 {x7 + x6 + x5+ x4+ x + 1} · {x5+ x4+ x2}. 
Ordinary polynomial multiplication (FOIL method) yields the following product: 
 x12 +x11+x11+ x10+x10+ x9+x9+x9+ x8+ x8+x7+x6+ x6+ x5+ x5+x4+ x3+ x2
The addition of polynomials utilizes the XOR operation resulting in the removal  
 
of all pairs of x with equal degree (shown in bold). This yields 
 
 x12 + x9+ x7+ x4+ x3+ x2. 




 x12 + x9+ x7+ x4+ x3+ x2 modulo x8+ x4 + x3+ x + 1 
 or in binary {1001010011100} modulo {100011011} 
This operation can be performed using the “long division” method below (note  
 
XOR is used in lieu of subtraction in ordinary long division). The result of the  
 




           0000000010010         
100011011 )1001010011100 
      100011011 
       00110010110 
              100011011 
               100011010 
               100011011 
               000000001 
 
Therefore the answer to Example 5 is: 
 
{11110011} · {00110100} = {00000001} 
or in hexadecimal,  
{F9} · {34} = {01} 
AES uses one other reducing polynomial during the transformation operation 
called MixColumns. This reducing polynomial is only used during the process of 
MixColumns and only when multiplying with a constant polynomial. This operation is 
treated differently because all inputs will have a degree smaller than four (l = 4). To 
define the multiplication operation in this transformation, the following reduction 
polynomial is used [DaR98], 
  l(x) = x4 + 1.              (7) 
This polynomial is not irreducible since in the Rijndael field 
  x4 + 1 = (x + 1)4.       (8) 
Since the polynomial is not irreducible and is an element of the Rijndael field, all 
operations during MixColumns remain in GF(28) with the exception that l(x) is the 
reducing polynomial rather than m(x). It is important to note that the reducing polynomial 
l(x) is only used to multiply with a fixed polynomial.  
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Daemen and Rijmen outline a matrix method for multiplying with a fixed 
polynomial using l(x) as the reduction polynomial [DaR98]. A summary of this method is 
outlined below. 
 Let c(x) be the fixed polynomial with degree three or 
  c(x) = c3 x3 + c2 x2 + c1 x + c0.    (9) 
Further, let a(x) and b(x) be two variable polynomials with coefficients ai and bi 
respectively with i being less than 4 such that b(x) = c(x) · a(x). The matrix representation 
of the transformation takes the coefficients of polynomial a as input and produces as 
output the coefficients of the polynomial b or 
b(x) = c(x) · a(x)              
≡ (c3 x3 + c2 x2 + c1 x + c0 ) · (a3 x3 + a2 x2 + a1 x + a0)  (11)  
≡ (b3 x3 + b2 x2 + b1 x + b0 ) mod (x4 + 1)   (12) 
After working out the product through ordinary polynomial multiplication, separating the 
conditions for different powers of x, and accounting for the modulus operation, Daemen 
and Rijmen give the following matrix representation of (12) [DaR98] 
0 0 3 2 1
1 1 0 3 2 1
2 2 1 0 3
3 3 2 1 0
b c c c c a
b c c c c a
b c c c c a




⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= ×
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
.    (13) 
This representation is only used for multiplication with a fixed polynomial during the 
MixColumns transformation.  
One significant property of a finite field is that each element of a finite field F has 
an inverse under multiplication. This property is used throughout the algorithm because it 
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allows a number to refer back to itself through a complex operation (i.e., multiplication). 
This characteristic is what allows ciphertext to be decrypted back into the original 
message. The method for determining the inverse element for a multiplication operation 
in a finite field is via the extended Euclidean Algorithm. The Euclidean Algorithm takes 
an element of the finite field, a(x), and finds the inverse element, b(x), while satisfying 
the following identity, 
a(x) x b(x) = 1 mod m(x)    (14) 
where m(x) is the reducing polynomial. If the above equation holds, then b(x) is the 
inverse element of a(x) in a finite field F under multiplication ‘·’ [DaR98].  Recall the 
solution to Example 5 was {F9} · {34} = {01} in the Rijndael finite field. According to 
the above property then F9 is the multiplicative inverse of 34 and vice versa. The 
extended Euclidean algorithm is applied to each element of the Rijndael finite field and 
the multiplicative inverses of all elements are recorded in Table 20 in Appendix A.  
 A key element of the algorithm is the Rijndael finite field. From F in the field 
GF(2), a suitable reduction polynomial m(x) is found. This defines multiplication and 
addition over a set of polynomials less than degree = 8, or F[x]| 8 as a field with 28 
elements denoted GF(28), and otherwise known as the Rijndael finite field.  
2.4 Description of the AES Algorithm 
The Data Encryption Standard expired in 1998 and the US National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) announced an open international competition for 
cipher designs to replace DES as the federal information processing standard [ZCN04]. 
Rijndael won the competition based on security, simplicity, and suitability for both 
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hardware and software implementations, and was designated the Advanced Encryption 
Standard. AES, like DES, is a symmetric key block cipher encryption algorithm. The 
basic operation of a symmetric key block cipher with 128 bit blocks and a 128 bit key is 
shown in Figure 1. A block cipher operates on fixed-length blocks of data, while 











Ciphertext 128 Bit Plaintext
Figure 1. Basic Operation of a Symmetric Key Cipher 
The standard AES algorithm operates on 128 bit blocks of data at a time, which is 
twice the block size of DES. AES supports keys of 128, 192, or 256 bit keys. The first 
stage of the algorithm is the KeyExpansion function which uses the Rijndael key 
schedule to produce separate 4x4 matrix of keys for each of the 10 encryption rounds 
used. Each round of encryption operates on a 4x4 matrix of bytes called the state and 
each encryption round has four stages or transformations: SubBytes, MixColumns, 
ShiftRows, and AddRoundKey [Wik07a]. The transformations targeted in this research 
are SubBytes and MixColumns for reasons to be discussed in Chapter III. A very basic 
discussion of the KeyExpansion, ShiftRows, and AddRoundKey follows while a more in 
depth description of SubBytes and MixColumns is presented. 
The algorithm shown in Figure 2 is a modified version of the original AES 







for( i = 1; i < 10; i++) Round(State, ExpandedKey[i]); 

















Figure 2. High Level Encryption Procedure for AES Algorithm [DaR98] 
The following descriptions of the particular stages of the AES algorithm follow 
Daemen and Rijmen’s design for AES targeting an 8-bit processor [DaR98]. This 
constraint excludes designs that operate on word lengths of 32 or greater for reasons of 
efficiency. 
The first operation to occur in AES is the KeyExpansion step. The input to this 
step is a 32-bit word, but the only time the entire word is operated on is during an 8-bit 
left rotate immediately after the data is input, which can be handled by an 8-bit processor. 
After the 8-bit shift, the SubBytes step is performed on all four individual bytes of the 
rotated word. The leftmost byte of the resulting word is XORed with the output of a 
procedure called Rcon. Rcon is defined as [Wik06b] 
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Rcon(i) = x(254+i) mod m(x)    (15) 
where, i is the iteration number. The most important aspect of the KeyExpansion step, as 
far as this research is concerned, is that KeyExpansion uses the SubBytes operation; thus 
the performance of KeyExpansion is directly related to that of SubBytes. 
The simplest AES transformation is the AddRoundKey step, shown in Figure 3, 
and it consists of XORing each byte of the particular state with the 4x4 key matrix 
created in the KeyExpansion stage for that specific encryption round.  
.  
Figure 3. AddRoundKey [Wik07a] 
Figure 4 shows the ShiftRows transformation. This step cyclically shifts each byte 
in each row of the state to the left by a predetermined amount. The standard AES 
algorithm does not shift any bytes in the first row, shifts each byte in the second row left 
by one byte, shifts each byte in the third row left by two bytes, and shifts each byte in the 
fourth row left by three bytes. This ensures that each column of the output will have 




Figure 4. ShiftRows [Wik07a] 
Outside of the Rcon operation during KeyExpansion, the transformations 
presented thus far have not reached beyond the computational complexity of bitwise 
XORing two bytes of data or shifting bytes left by a predetermined amount. The 
computational complexity of the KeyExpansion step directly relates to the computation 
complexity of SubBytes. The SubBytes and MixColumns transformations are the most 
complicated and hardware intensive steps in the AES process, therefore they are the 
transformations most attractive for optimization. What follows is a description of the 
specific designs for the AES transformations MixColumns and SubBytes for an 8-bit 
processor from The Design of Rijndael [DaR98]. 
In SubBytes, each byte in the state is replaced with its specific entry, S, in a fixed 
256 byte look-up table (LUT), which can be found in Table 21 in Appendix A. This look-
up table, known as an S-box, is generated using inverse functions of a finite field and 
provides an element of non-linearity to the system. During decryption, a separate 256 
byte look-up table containing the values of the inverse SubBytes transformation is used. 
This look-up table can be found in Table 22 in Appendix A. More detail in the generation 
of these tables is provided in the SubBytes designs outlined in Chapter III. This SubBytes 
implementation is the standard design for the SubBytes transformation for use on an 8-
Bit processor [DaR98]. This design is called a LUT design for obvious reasons.  
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The MixColumns step combines all four bytes of each of the four columns of the 
state using an invertible linear transformation polynomial. The four bytes of each column 
are inputs and each input affects all four bytes of the output. Since the dimensions of the 
columns consist of 4 bytes, this is optimal for 32-bit architectures using look-up table 
implementations [DaR98]. This fact makes the implementation of MixColumns in an 8-
bit architecture without using LUTs an extremely difficult and hardware intensive 
process. Daemen and Rijmen point out that good MixColumn performance on 8-bit 
processors is not trivial to obtain because its design is best suited for a 32-bit processor. 
The MixColumns transformation takes the columns of the state in polynomial form over 
the Rijndael finite field and multiplies them modulo l(x) (cf. (7) ) with a fixed polynomial 
c(x). Figure 5 shows how each column is multiplied by a fixed polynomial c(x). 
 
Figure 5. MixColumns [Wik07a] 
The polynomial c(x) is 
 c(x) = 03 · x3 + 01 · x2 + 01 · x + 02.    (16) 
This polynomial is coprime to l(x) and is therefore invertible [DaR98]. The inverse of 
c(x) is d(x) and is used for the inverse MixColumns routine during the process of 
decryption. The polynomial d(x) is 
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d(x) = 0B · x3 + 0D · x2 + 09 · x + 0E.    (17) 
By substituting c(x) into (13), the matrix representation for multiplication in the Rijndael 
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 Recall that the input to MixColumns is a 32 bit string representing the four 
columns in the state. Thus, each coefficient of a is comprised of four bits in F[x]| 4. To 
implement this on an 8-bit processor, (18) must be executed in hardware. Multiplication 
with the coefficient 01 requires no processing power because the input equals the output. 
Daemen and Rijmen outline a process for multiplication with 02 and 03 on an 8-bit 
platform. This process takes advantage of the fact that all elements of the Rijndael finite 
field can be written as a sum of powers of 02 since the characteristic of the Rijndael finite 
field is 2. This fact coupled with the idea that the value 02 is associated with the 
polynomial x makes it possible to construct a 256 byte table of all possible 8-bit input 
values and their subsequent values after being multiplied by 02 in the Rijndael field. The 
multiplication by 02 is denoted xtime(y) where y is the value to be multiplied. Example 6 
illustrates how xtime is used to multiply an input b by the constant value 05. 
Example 6. Use xtime to multiply the input value b by the constant value 05. 
Solution 
b · 05  = b · (01 04) = b · (01 ⊕ ⊕022) 
  




used twice or 
 
 = b ⊕xtime(xtime(b)). 
The look-up table for the xtime process can be found in Table 24 in Appendix A. 
This table is used to determine the product of any two 8-bit input values. The most 
complex multiplication during MixColumns is a multiplication by 03, as shown in (13). 
Since the coefficients of d(x) (c.f., (17) ) are much higher than c(x) (c.f., (16) ), the 
Rijndael design for an 8-bit platform uses a simple property of matrix multiplication to 
develop a preprocessing step used during the inverse MixColumns routine. The following 
relationship holds between the MixColumns polynomial c(x) and the inverse 
MixColumns polynomial d(x) [DaR98] 
d(x) = (04 x2 + 05) c(x) mod l(x).    (19) 
This follows from the matrix notation  
0 0 0 09 02 03 01 01 05 00 04 00
09 0 0 0 01 02 03 01 00 05 00 04
0 09 0 0 01 01 02 03 04 00 05 00
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  (20) 
which is the inverse MixColumns matrix as defined in (17) and (13) obtained by 
multiplying the original MixColumns matrix in (18) by a preprocessing matrix [DaR98]. 
This preprocessing step reduces the number of 256 byte look-up tables needed to one and 
can be used for both MixColumns and inverse Mixcolumns as opposed to SubBytes, 
which requires two tables (one for SubBytes and one for inverse SubBytes). This design 
for MixColumns is designated the Full LUT design. 
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The specification of the above designs for MixColumns and SubBytes effectively 
outlines the baseline AES design used during the experiment outlined in Chapter III.  
2.5 Current Research into AES Implementations on FPGAs 
2.5.1 Optimization Techniques  
Most research uses three metrics to evaluate AES system performance. These 






=     (21) 
where is how many clock cycles is required for the input block to be 
fully encrypted and 
_ _cycles per block
clkf  is the MAXIMUM clock frequency [ZCN04]. The constant 128 
is the number of bits in an input block.  
Area Occupied is a contentious issue. “It is difficult to make direct comparisons 
between FPGA implementations of any algorithm since the specific hardware target is 
often different” [ZCN04]. Some authors, such as Zambreno and Saqib, define Area 
Occupied as the number of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) used by a particular 
design [ZCN04] [SDR]. Other authors, such as Good, properly include the amount of 





Figure 6. FPGA Design Methodology [ZCN04] 
 Area Occupied should be measured in total equivalent gates required to 
implement the design. This goes against the current research standard but it allows an 
objective comparison of the size of a design between chip families. Design areas reported 
in CLB slices and equivalent CLB slices can only be independently compared to designs 
which are implemented on the same chip or, to some lesser degree, the same chip family. 
When design areas are reported in CLB slices between two chips that are not of the same 
chip family or even the same manufacturer, it cannot be an accurate comparison because 
of variations in CLB slice capacity across chip families/manufacturers; for example, a 
Xilinx Spartan CLB capacity is not as large as a Xilinx Virtex 5 CLB.  
Rudra contends that only total equivalent gate count (memory included) can 
accurately measure and provide an objective comparison of design area between designs 
implemented on various chips [Rud01]. His research metrics are summarized in Table 4. 
Since most operational systems requiring AES implement the algorithm on ASICs rather 
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than FPGAs, it makes sense to report area occupied as a measure of gates, which can be 
compared to both ASIC and FPGA designs, rather than CLBs, which can only be 
accurately compared to designs implemented on the same FPGA chip. Research that 
presents designs measured in some estimate of theoretical gate counts are considered 
unreliable. Therefore gate counts only obtained by HDL synthesizers or by ASIC design 
fabrication methods are used herein. Theoretical gate counts are unreliable since they 
cannot be directly implemented in hardware nor do they account for buffers required to 
achieve correct timing as well as other factors which may increase the gate count at the 
place and route stage of synthesis.  
 Since most of the current literature reviewed reports area occupied in CLBs or 
slices, a method for estimating gate counts must be devised. For each FPGA chip it 
manufactures, Xilinx provides a maximum gate capability (logic and RAM) as well as a 
total number of CLBs. From these two measures it is possible to devise a conversion 
factor which translates an area in CLBs to an estimate of area given in total equivalent 
gate count as shown below. This conversion factor is unique for each Xilinx chip model 
used and is  
_ _
_
gates maximum gate capability
CLB total CLBs
=    (22) 
where the conversion factor is gates
CLB
. maximum_gate_capability is the maximum 
number of gates an FPGA  has the potential of implementing and total_CLBs is the total 
number of CLBs the FPGA contains. Both maximum_gate_capability and total_CLBs are 
reported by the chip manufacturer. 
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Much research has focused on increasing the performance of the various stages of 
AES (MixColumns, SubBytes, KeyExpansion, AddRoundKey, and ShiftRows) but this 
same research does not account for how the different transformations interact with each 
other to affect the design of AES as a whole. The only recent research on AES designs 
targeting an 8-bit processor found that “a good FPGA based 8-bit datapath for 
comparison could not be found”[GoB05].  
Zambreno attempts to balance throughput, latency, and area efficiency by 
searching for an optimal point in the pyramid in Figure 6. As the figure illustrates, simple 
methods of increasing throughput have a negative effect on area efficiency. One such 
method is loop unrolling. A loop will normally execute an operation in the same area of 
hardware numerous times. When loop unrolling is used, that area of hardware is 
replicated as many times as the loop needs to execute so the loop can execute in parallel. 
It is easy to see how this method has a dramatically negative effect on area efficiency. 
Loop unrolling is a common method of optimizing encryption algorithms since 
encryption performs multiple operations on blocks of input data numerous times.  
Figure 7a shows the Rijndael algorithm without modification. The algorithm runs 
a loop using rotating inputs from the key expansion block and the 128-bit state register to 
hold all plaintext input states. As shown in Figure 7b, This function can be optimized by 
unrolling this loop and executing each encryption round using its own dedicated 
hardware circuit for each of 10 rounds and storing the results of each round in 10 
different 128 bit registers [QIS05]. The pyramid in Figure 6 would show a significant 
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increase in throughput, although since the hardware already used large area, increasing 
throughput in this fashion will result in a dramatic decrease in area efficiency. 
 
Figure 7. Loop Unrolling an AES Architecture [QIS05] 
Another method of increasing throughput is pipelining. Pipelining maximizes 
hardware utilization by executing multiple instructions simultaneously with each 
instruction being in a different stage of execution at any one moment. Pipelining does not 
require the addition of any new functional hardware, in fact pipelining is a simple method 
of making the most of the hardware already available. For this reason, except for the 
overhead associated with starting a pipeline, it is possible to increase throughput and 
decrease latency with a small effect on area efficiency.  
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Another technique increases the throughput of AES by parallelizing stages of 
Rijndael’s algorithm [CaA03]. Figure 8 reduces the entire MixColumns stage of AES 
into simple combinational logic.  
 
Figure 8. Parallelization of MixColumns [CaA03] 
Although it may be the dominant catalyst for optimization, throughput is not the 
only important measure of an implementation. Area efficiency is a design consideration 
when implementing AES since an increase in area efficiency means an AES chip can 
operate using less hardware as well as requiring less power. Many portable electronic 
devices such as cell phones or mobile WLAN terminals could benefit from AES, but 
since they require batteries, power consumption is an issue. For these hardware 
platforms, an efficient design should deliver an acceptable throughput while maintaining 
high area efficiency to reduce power consumption. A quick analysis of Figure 6 shows 
how difficult this is to reach. In fact, most methods designed to increase area efficiency 
have a detrimental impact on the system’s overall throughput.  
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There are minor variations in the definition of area efficiency; for example, 
Zambreno and Saqib define area efficiency as  




     (23) 
which measures the throughput per CLB or slice [ZCN04][SDR]. Therefore, a high Area 
Efficiency implies a more efficient design. In contrast Pionteck defines area efficiency as 
the inverse of (23) or  




)      (24) 
which measures the area in CLBs needed per one kbps [Pio04]. Therefore, a low number 
signifies a more efficient design. This research reports area in terms of total equivalent 
gates rather than CLBs or slices, 




.   (25) 
Recently the AES algorithm was selected for the upcoming WLAN standard 
IEEE 802.11i [Pio04]. This means portable electronic devices using this new WLAN 
standard such as network cards for laptops and mobile WLAN terminals will benefit from 
a design with optimized power consumption through a highly efficient area design.  
 Area efficiency is a significant design goal when dealing with devices that require 
a small amount of hardware as well as relatively high throughput. Some designs have 
modest throughput requirements but require the hardware to be as small as possible. For 
these systems, reducing hardware area will come at a dramatic cost in throughput.  
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2.6 Typical Design Parameter Values 
2.6.1 AES Throughput 
The fastest FPGA implementation of the AES algorithm transmits at 23.65 Gbps 
[GoB05]. Since this implementation had maximizing throughput as the primary objective, 
area occupied and area efficiency suffer. It is because of this trade-off that this design is 
the largest of those reported in Table 4. The data for gates per slice is from the 
documentation for the Xilinx Virtex-II family of FPGAs [Xil07]. Similar results were 
produced by Zambreno although the maximum optimized throughput was only 23.57 
Gbps [ZCN04]. Another high-speed implementation of the AES algorithm achieved a 
throughput of 16.5 Gbps [JST03]. 
Table 4. Throughput Comparison of Previous AES Designs  
























16693 186 3,104,898 184.8 23.65
Rudra  
[Rud01] 
ASIC - - 256,000 32.0 7.50
2.6.2 AES Area Efficiency 
AES operates on 128 bit blocks of data for each encryption round. Current 
literature has numerous examples of partitioning the blocks of 128 bits into smaller sub-
blocks called datapaths to maximize area efficiency [GoB05]. However, by breaking one 
128 bit block of data into smaller, more manageable sub-blocks, a number of additional 
cycles are required to complete each encryption round. As the 128 bit block of data is 
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divided into datapaths, the number of cycles required to complete an encryption round 
increases and consequently has a detrimental effect on throughput. The most common 
datapath size is 32 bits and can only be implemented on a platform with 32-bit processing 
capability [GoB05]. The Good design achieves a balance between area efficiency and 
throughput is achieved at this datapath size. 
When calculating total area occupied by a particular design, the size of a 
particular FPGA’s block memory should be included [GoB05]. Different FPGAs have 
different sizes of block memories. For example, the block memory size on a Xilinx 
Spartan-II is only 4 kbits whereas the block memory sizes on a Xilinx Spartan-III or 
Vertex-II are 18 kbits [GoB05]. Translating this into the equivalent number of slices 
those bits will occupy gives a common basis for comparison [GoB05]. Another method 
of determining area is in the number of Configurable Logic Block (CLB) slices used by 
the design [SDR]. Many studies do not include the block RAM used by a design, but only 
report the number of CLBs or slices and thereby underestimate the actual hardware 
required.  
As shown in Table 5, the highest area efficiency, as calculated by (25) while 
ignoring block RAM was 15.72 [Rou04]. However, when block RAM is included, this 
number drops to 1.89. Chodowiec and Gaj have the most area efficient AES design 
including block RAM with 2.30; when block RAM is not considered efficiency rises to 















Device XC2S30-6 XC3S50-4 XC2V40-6 
Slices 222 163 146 
Gates / Slice 138 130 156 
Gates (Ignoring 
RAM) 
30,636 21,190 22,776 
Throughput (kbps) 166,000 208,000 358,000 
Area Efficiency 
(ignoring block RAM)
5.42 9.82   15.72 
Bits of block RAM 
used 
9600 34176 34176 
Equiv slices for block 
RAM 
300 1068 1068 
Total equiv slices 522 1231 1214 
Total equivalent  gate 
count 
72,036 160,030 189,384 
Area Efficiency 
(accounting for block 
RAM) 
2.30 1.30 1.89 
 
2.6.3 AES Area Optimization 
The smallest AES design, in equivalent gates required to implement the design 
used only 41,184 gates on a Xilinx XC2S15-6 using an 8-bit platform [GoB05]. Table 6 
illustrates how the optimization of area usage affects throughput and area efficiency. 
The highlighted values in Table 6 correspond to the largest values in the most 
important measures of merit: area, throughput, and area efficiency. Good’s design is the 
lowest in both gates used as well as total equivalent gates when accounting for the 
amount of FPGA block RAM being used. Chodowiec and Gaj boast the highest area 
efficiency while accounting for block RAM [ChG01]. Rouvroy achieves the best area 
efficiency when block RAM is ignored [Rou04]. 
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Device XC2S15-6 XC2S30-6 XC2V40-6 
Datapath 
Length (bits) 
8 32 32 
CLB Slices 124 222 146 
Gates / Slice 156 138 156 
Gates (Ignoring 
Block Ram) 
19,344 30,636 22,776 
Throughput 
(kbps) 




0.018 0.75 15.72 
Bits of Block 
RAM used 
4480 9600 34176 
Equiv Slices for 
Block RAM 
140 300 1068 
Total Equiv 
Slices 
264 522 1214 
Total Equiv 
Gates 




0.0534 2.30 0.529 
2.7 Overview of research into the validation of encryption circuits  
When NIST selected one of the many candidates to replace DES as the new 
encryption standard AES, three evaluation criteria were used to determine which 
algorithm was best: security, cost, and algorithm and implementation characteristics 
[Nis01]. The most important factor in NIST’s decision was the overall security of the 
algorithm using two different criteria: a quantitative analysis of the general security of the 
algorithm and the algorithm’s ability to withstand attack. For AES optimization research 
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however, the most important characteristic is the correctness of the implementation (i.e.,  
whether or not the implemented algorithm EXACTLY matches the specification of AES).  
NIST released the Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm Validation Suite 
(AESAVS) in November 2002. The suite provides three different tests which validate the 
functionality of the AES algorithm: the Monte Carlo algorithm test, the Multi-Block 
Message test, and the Known Answer Test. AES is a substitution cipher. That is, if the 
same block of data is run through the algorithm multiple times with the same key, the 
output ciphertext will be exactly the same each time. The Known Answer Tests take 
advantage of this and are an easy method of determining the functionality of a particular 
AES implementation through the use of look up tables containing the expected answers. 
There are four different types of known answer tests: GFSbox, KeySbox, Variable Key, 
and Variable Text. GFSbox and KeySbox each test the functionality of the Substitution 
Box (S-Box) elements of the AES and DES ciphers.  
Variable Key and Variable Text Known Answer Tests are the most easily 
realizable methods of testing the functionality of an AES implementation. The Variable 
Key test simply keeps the plain text input block constant at all zeros and varies the value 
of the key. The AES validation suite provides look up tables containing the known 
ciphertext output for zeroed out plain text and different key values. Table 7 is an example 
of a Variable Key Known Answer Test value look up table. The Variable Text works the 
same way as the Variable Key test but Variable Text operates on a zeroed out key and 
varies the value of the plaintext. 
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Table 7. Variable Key Known Answer Test Values for Keysize = 128 
 
2.8 Summary 
 This chapter describes the baseline AES design. The design is specified by the 
creators of AES and is composed of a full LUT design for both the SubBytes and 
MixColumns transformations. This chapter also presents current research topics on the 
implementation of AES on FPGAs and provides tables of common values associated with 
each performance metric to be tested. The designs that perform best for each metric are 
highlighted. These designs allow a comparison to be made between the performance of 
AES designs in current literature and the new AES designs specified in Chapter III. 
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III.  Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the experiment conducted in this research. 
3.2 Problem Definition 
 3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis 
This research has two primary goals. The first is to improve the performance of 
the baseline design of AES targeting an 8-bit platform based on throughput, area 
occupied, and area efficiency. This goal is met when a design is produced has a better 
performance than the baseline design. Designs developed herein are compared to designs 
from literature that specifically target each metric. Table 8 lists the best values for each 
AES metric as reported in current literature. These designs target each specific metric 
individually (i.e., throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied) and use hardware 
optimization techniques not considered in this effort for reasons of area efficiency. 
Table 8. AES FPGA Performance in Current Literature 















Chodowiec & Gaj 
[ChG01] 
XC2S30-6 2.30
Area Occupied Good 
[GoB05] 





 The second goal of this research is to answer the following question: how does 
each factor interact and affect each metric and do the changes to the baseline design 
increase performance? This goal directly supports the hypothesis to be tested. By using 
modular inversion in an extended field and composite modular inversion in a subfield 
during the transformation of SubBytes in lieu of a full look up table as defined in the 
baseline design; and by utilizing a bitwise shift and combinational logic in the 
transformation of MixColumns, it is expected that the performance of AES can be 
improved to a level that surpasses the baseline AES performance. 
3.2.2 Approach 
The approach to achieving the first goal uses four techniques to reduce hardware 
requirements in the transformations for MixColumns and SubBytes. The amount of 
hardware needed can be reduced by computing values rather than using LUTs. SubBytes 
requires a table of 256 bytes to store the SubBytes step and another table of 256 bytes to 
perform the inverse of SubBytes. MixColumns uses one 256 byte table and together with 
SubBytes these two transformations use a total of 768 bytes of memory (these values are 
the uncompressed storage requirement). Table 8 illustrates the significant impact memory 
usage has on area efficiency. When total memory usage is not accounted for, the best area 
efficiency attained by current research is 15.72, but when memory is taken into account 
the area efficiency drops to 2.30. MixColumns and SubBytes are targeted because they 
are the only transformations to use any operations outside of combinational logic and use 
LUTs as their primary means of execution. The second goal is realized by evaluating 
each technique’s impact on performance separately. The experiment compares these 
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results with the results obtained from each possible combination of optimization 
techniques.  
3.3 System Boundaries 
The system under test is called the Data Encryption System. The Data Encryption 
System consists of four components illustrated in Figure 9. The first component of the 
Data Encryption System is the hardware description language used to create the 






























































Figure 9. System Under Test  
The AES algorithm component always contains the verified inverse cipher 
(decryption). It is assumed that the design used for encrypting data will also be used for 
decrypting data (i.e., a MixColumns Full LUT design for encryption will not be 
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combined with a MixColumns combinational logic design for decryption). While 
combining different designs for encryption and decryption will still properly encrypt and 
decrypt data, this method is avoided in order to maintain symmetry in the experiment. 
The third component is the FPGA being used as well as the development board. This 
device is the Xilinx Virtex-II PRO XC2VP30.  The final component is the various design 
techniques used to improve the algorithm’s performance. The scope of this study is 
limited to controlling the three factors and observing the three metrics. The input 
(workload) to the system under test is the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. 
3.4 System Services 
The Data Encryption System encrypts the input data stream using the AES 
algorithm. The first, and most desirable, outcome is for the Data Encryption System to 
correctly encrypt the input data stream. The verification of proper encryption is done 
using the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. The second possible outcome of the system 
is for the Data Encryption System to improperly encrypt the input data stream. The result 
of this outcome is that the system will be unable to recover the entire, correct input data 
stream. The third possible outcome of the data encryption system is that no encryption 
occurs. The result of this outcome is that the input data stream is exactly the same as the 
output of the system. The final possibility is that nothing occurs. The result of this 
outcome is that no signal is observed at the output. This indicates a complete malfunction 




The workload for the Data Encryption System is the NIST Algorithm Validation 
Suite. When applied to an implementation, the suite verifies the correctness of the 
implementation. This is a suitable workload for the Data Encryption System because it is 
provided by the institute responsible for the creation of the Advanced Encryption 
Standard. Another added benefit of using the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite is that it 
not only provides a suitable input data stream for the system, but also verifies that the 
system is providing the correct service (i.e., properly encrypting the input data stream).  
3.6 Performance Metrics 
Three performance metrics are used to evaluate system performance: throughput, 





=     (25) 
where is the number of clock cycles required for the input block to 
be fully encrypted and 
_ _cycles per block
clkf  is the MAXIMUM clock frequency as identified by the 
hardware description language (HDL) synthesizer. The HDL synthesizer is the Xilinx 
XST synthesizer, which identifies a design’s critical path and subsequently determines 
the theoretical maximum combinational delay measured in seconds. This measurement is 
the minimum clock period and since frequency is the inverse of period, the maximum 
clock frequency can easily be determined. The constant 128 is the number of bits in an 
input block. Maximum clock frequency does not solely determine throughput as 
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throughput is also inversely related to the number of clock cycles required to operate on a 
block of data.  
Area efficiency is defined as 




)      (26) 
where throughput is from (25) and Area is measured in gates. The total equivalent gate 
count is measured by the HDL synthesizer. 
3.7 Parameters
3.7.1 System 
• FPGA Type – Different FPGA’s have inherent differences in performance; for 
example, a Xilinx Spartan CLB slice is different from a Xilinx Virtex CLB 
slice. 
• HDL Synthesis Tool – It is unlikely that two different synthesis tools will 
implement the same HDL code the same way. The synthesis tool used in this 
experiment is the Xilinx XST tool packaged with the full version of the Xilinx 
ISE 8.2i software. 
• Synthesis Goal – The Xilinx XST synthesis tool requires a user defined input 
as to the desired overall goal of the design synthesis. The two options are 
synthesize to reduce area or synthesize to increase speed. The option to 
increase speed does so by reducing the number of logic levels required by the 
design. This means that synthesizing for speed does not necessarily indicate 
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an increase in area occupied nor is it certain that synthesizing for area will 
result in a decrease in speed. 
• ShiftRows Design – There are many designs that properly implement the 
ShiftRows transformation. The ShiftRows design used in this research is 
defined by The Design of Rijndael for an 8-bit platform as described in 
Chapter II [DaR98]. 
• AddRoundKey Design – The AddRoundKey design used in this research is 
implemented as a bitwise XOR of the round key and the state as defined by 
The Design of Rijndael for an 8-bit platform as described in Chapter II. 
• KeyExpansion Design – The KeyExpansion step requires using the SubBytes 
transformation. SubBytes is considered an experimental factor yet 
KeyExpansion is not. This is possible by using a function call for SubBytes 
within the KeyExpansion HDL design. This allows for hardware executing the 
KeyExpansion transformation to remain the same but permits the hardware 
implementing SubBytes to change. Thus the SubBytes design can be 
considered an experimental factor while the KeyExpansion design remains a 
constant system parameter. 
• MixColumns Design – The baseline design for MixColumns is explained in 
detail in Chapter II. The MixColumns transformation is the most difficult to 
achieve good performance on an 8-bit processor due to 4 byte column blocks 
of data [DaR98].  
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• SubBytes Design – The baseline specification for the SubBytes transformation 
on an 8-bit platform consumes the most memory in AES. The baseline design 
uses two independent 256 byte LUTs; one for the encryption cipher 
(SubBytes) and one for the decryption cipher (inverse SubBytes). 
3.7.2 Workload 
• Validation Suite – The NIST Algorithm Verification Suite validates the AES 
algorithm through a number of tests. One such test is the Known Answer Test. 
This test takes advantage of the fact that AES is a substitution cipher and if 
the same input is used with the same key, the cipher text will always be the 
same. The entire battery of Known Answer Tests is run on each design of 
AES to ensure correctness, but only one Known Answer Test is used as the 
workload in this experiment. This test is the rotating plaintext test, which 
maintains an all zero key and varies the input plaintext. 
• Key Length –AES has the option of using a 128, 192, or 256 bit key. 
Increasing key length increases the amount of computation required to encrypt 
and therefore decreases throughput. For this experiment, the key length is set 
at 128 bits. 
3.8 Factors 
The factors for this experiment are: MixColumns design, SubBytes design, and 
Synthesis Goal. The specific levels of the transformation factors (MixColumns and 
SubBytes) are determined by which design is utilized during an experiment. The levels 
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for the factor of synthesis goal are area or speed. These factors and their levels are 
summarized in Table 9. SubBytes was chosen as an experimental factor because it 
consumes the most memory in AES. There are a number of alternative designs for 
implementing a more compact version of the AES S-box, but most of these designs use 
multiplication or access memory in a way that cannot be easily supplied by an 8-bit 
processor. The three designs chosen for SubBytes in this experiment can be executed on 
an 8-bit platform. The first of these designs is the LUT design outlined in Chapter II (cf. 
Description of the AES Algorithm) and is the Rijndael specified baseline design for AES 
on an 8-bit platform. The other two designs focus on modular inversion in a finite field. 
These designs are called Modular Inversion in an Extended Field and Modular Inversion 
in a Composite Field.  
Table 9. Factor Levels 
 
Factor Level 
SubBytes Design Full LUT, 
Modular Inversion in an Extended Field, 
Modular Inversion in a Composite Field 
MixColumns Design Full LUT,  
Half LUT,  
Combinational Logic 
Synthesis Direction Area, Speed 
The size of the input and output blocks for the MixColumns routine makes the 
transform ideal for implementation on a 32-bit platform. For this reason, the task of 
implementing the MixColumns stage of AES on an 8-bit platform with good performance 
(i.e., low area and high throughput) is not a trivial task [DaR98]. MixColumns is chosen 
as a factor for this reason. Past research on MixColumns has introduced a number of 
alternative designs. These designs encompass a range of implementation options for 
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MixColumns. The first is the Rijndael specified Full LUT design, as described in Chapter 
II. The second design was developed during this research and is the baseline design 
modified such that it requires half of the original LUT to operate. This design is titled the 
Half LUT design. The final design was developed by Satyanarayana and follows an 
algorithm created by Trenholme, which implements MixColumns using combinational 
logic alone [Sat04]. These three design levels were chosen because they represent the 
entire spectrum of MixColumns designs from a full look up table design to an entirely 
combinational logic design. These designs are described in detail in the following section 
labeled “Experimental Factor Designs”.  
3.9 Experimental Factor Designs 
3.9.1 SubBytes 
3.9.1.1 Modular Inversion in an Extended Field 
There are two fundamental steps performed in the SubBytes transformation. The 
first step is the most mathematically complex and the most difficult to implement in 
hardware: the modular inversion of a polynomial in the Rijndael finite field. The second 
step is an invertible operation known as an affine transformation. A critical aspect of this 
design is the fact that the inverse SubBytes transform is simply the two steps reversed. 
Thus, during decryption the inverse SubBytes step executes the inverse affine transform 
and then determines the modular inverse, as shown in Figure 13. This is important 
because it allows the entire SubBytes operation (both encryption and decryption) to use 
one 256 byte look-up table containing all modular inverses in a Rijndael Field. The 
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generation of this table is explained in the Chapter II and the table itself can be found in 
Table 20 in Appendix A. 
 Both the affine transform and its inverse are specified in The Design of Rijndael. 
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   (27) 
where b is the affine transform of a [DaR98]. The coefficients of the polynomial to be 
transformed in (27), a, is multiplied with a binary matrix; the result of which is XORed 
with a constant bit pattern {01100011}. Implementing (27) in VHDL using only 8-bit 
operations would be a complex operation if the elements of the matrix were anything but 
binary. Since, however, the matrix is binary, the product of the matrix multiplication will 
only yield either the identity of coefficient ai (multiply by 1) or 0 (multiply by 0). If each 
coefficient of b is treated as a separate entity rather than as elements of a column vector, 
it is possible to map a unique equation for each coefficient of b. This can be achieved via 
ordinary matrix multiplication on the 8x8 binary matrix and the vector of a coefficients. 
This result is XORed with the corresponding bit from the constant bit pattern, which 
results in the following equations for each coefficient of b 
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7 7 6 5 4 3
6 6 5 4 3 2
5 5 4 3 2 1
4 4 3 2 1 0
3 7 3 2 1 0
2 7 6 2 1 0
1 7 6 5 1 0
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            (28) 
The equations in (28) are equivalent to (27) except that (28) replaces matrix arithmetic, 
which is difficult to implement in hardware, with simple combinational logic using only 
XOR gates. (28) can be implemented on an 8-bit platform using the VHDL code in 
Figure 10. Notice that as the number of ‘1’s in the binary matrix increases, so too does 
the number of XOR gates required to implement the necessary matrix multiplication. 
variable a: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable b: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
  b(7) := a(7) xor a(6) xor a(5) xor a(4) xor a(3) xor '0';   
  b(6) := a(6) xor a(5) xor a(4) xor a(3) xor a(2) xor '1';   
  b(5) := a(5) xor a(4) xor a(3) xor a(2) xor a(1) xor '1';   
  b(4) := a(4) xor a(3) xor a(2) xor a(1) xor a(0) xor '0';   
  b(3) := a(7) xor a(3) xor a(2) xor a(1) xor a(0) xor '0';   
  b(2) := a(7) xor a(6) xor a(2) xor a(1) xor a(0) xor '0';   
  b(1) := a(7) xor a(6) xor a(5) xor a(1) xor a(0) xor '1';   
  b(0) := a(7) xor a(6) xor a(5) xor a(4) xor a(0) xor '1'; 
 
Figure 10. VHDL Code Implementing the Affine Transform 
 The inverse affine transform used during decryption precedes the modular 











0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0









⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
























   (29) 
where b is the input polynomial [DaR98]. Applying the same technique used above to 
derive (28) from (27), (29) is reduced into individual equations for each coefficient of b. 
This yields 
7 6 4 1
6 5 3 0
5 7 4 2
4 6 3 1
3 5 2 0
2 7 4 1
1 6 3 0
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     (30) 
which can be implemented on an 8-bit platform using the VHDL code in Figure 11. 
variable a: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable b: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 
  a(7) := b(6) xor b(4) xor b(1) xor '0';   
  a(6) := b(5) xor b(3) xor b(0) xor '0';   
  a(5) := b(7) xor b(4) xor b(2) xor '0';   
  a(4) := b(6) xor b(3) xor b(1) xor '0';   
  a(3) := b(5) xor b(2) xor b(0) xor '0';   
  a(2) := b(7) xor b(4) xor b(1) xor '1';   
  a(1) := b(6) xor b(3) xor b(0) xor '0';   
  a(0) := b(7) xor b(5) xor b(2) xor '1'; 
 




The design Modular Inversion in an Extended Field consists of the three parts 
outlined above: 256 byte modular inversion LUT, affine transform, and inverse affine 
transform. The affine transform is only used during encryption and is executed after 
modular inversion. The inverse affine transform is only used during decryption and is 
executed before modular inversion. The entire VHDL code used for implementing the 
SubBytes design Modular Inversion in an Extended Field can be found in Appendix B. 
The objective of this design is to reduce the memory required to perform SubBytes by 
replacing the two 256 byte LUTs (one for encryption and one for decryption) with one 
256 byte LUT that can be used for both encryption and decryption. The cost of this 
replacement is an increase in combinational logic used to perform the affine transforms. 
Figure 12 illustrates a block diagram of this design during encryption and Figure 13 
illustrates the design for decryption. In both figures y represents the input to the 
transformation while z is the output. 
Affine TransformModular Inversionin GF(28)
y y-1 z
 
Figure 12. SubBytes design flow for Modular Inversion in an Extended Field  
Affine Transform Modular Inversionin GF(28)
y z
 
Figure 13. Inverse SubBytes design flow for Modular Inversion in an Extended Field 
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3.9.1.2 Modular Inversion in a Composite Field 
The most mathematically complex operation of the AES cipher is modular 
inversion in a finite field. A more compact implementation of the cipher’s S-box can be 
obtained by performing modular inversion in the field GF(24)2 rather than in GF(28) 
[Rij94]. The field over GF(28) called an extended field while the more compact 
representation GF(24)2 is called a composite field. The field GF(24) is referred to as a 
subfield. To perform modular inversion in the extended field requires a 256 byte LUT. 
An equivalent representation of the extended Rijndael field into a more compressed 
subfield over GF(24)2 reduces the size of the LUT to just 8 bytes. Figure 14 illustrates the 
design flow of SubBytes for Rijmen’s efficient S-box implementation for encryption and 
Figure 15 shows the process for decryption. 
Modular Inversion
























Figure 15. Inverse SubBytes Design Flow for Composite Field Inversion 
Every element of GF(28) can be written as a polynomial of the first degree with 
coefficients from GF(24). This polynomial has the form bx + c, where b and c are 
coefficients from GF(24) [Rij94]. The reducing polynomial for multiplication in this field 
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is an irreducible second degree polynomial of the form x2 + Ax + B where the A and B 
coefficients are constants from GF(24) [Rij94]. The values for the A and B coefficients 
are unspecified. However, the inverse of an element of GF(28) represented in GF(24)2 as 
bx + c is [Rij94]      


















Figure 16. Schematic of Modular Inversion in a Composite Field 
Figure 16 illustrates a schematic representation of (31) where p represents the b(b2 B + 
bcA + c2)-1 term and q represents the (c + bA) (b2 B + bcA + c2)-1 term. The schematic 
shown in Figure 16 corresponds to the “Modular Inversion in GF(24)2” blocks in Figures 
4 and 5. Before Figure 16 can be implemented, an invertible method for mapping 
elements of GF(28) into polynomials with coefficients in GF(24) must be defined. 
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Paar and Rosner map a finite field over GF(28) into an equivalent representation 
over GF(24)2 using a transformation matrix. However, this method is only valid for fields 
that use primitive reducing polynomials [PaR97]. The Rijndael field reducing polynomial 
m(x) is irreducible but not primitive [Rud01]. Therefore, the Paar and Rosner method 
cannot be used directly. However, Rudra used the Paar and Rosner method to develop an 
algorithm for determining transformation matrices specifically for the Rijndael field. This 
algorithm is composed of three steps that ensure the matrix has the required mathematical 
properties [Rud01]. These steps are iterated until a matrix has all of the properties 
specified in the algorithm. Rudra uses his algorithm to determine a transformation matrix 
which correctly splits a polynomial in GF(28) into a first degree polynomial with 
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where b and c are the coefficients of the polynomial bx + c and y is a polynomial in 
GF(28) [Rud01]. The matrix which maps from GF(24)2 back to GF(28) is the 
mathematical inverse of the original transformation matrix shown in (32). Therefore, the 
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.   (33) 
As the number of ‘1’s a matrix contains increases, so does the number of XOR 
operations required to perform the matrix multiplication. The transformation matrix in 
(32) contains 28 ‘1’s and its inverse in (33) contains 29 ‘1’s for a total of 57 ‘1’s in both 
matrices. O’Driscoll’s research uses the Paar algorithm determining a transform matrix to 
find a more efficient (i.e., less ‘1’s) version of the transform matrix. He was able to find a 
transform matrix containing 27 ‘1’s and whose corresponding inverse matrix contains 24 
‘1’s for a total of 51 ‘1’s between the two matrices. Therefore the mapping equations in 
this research will use O’Driscoll’s more efficient transform matrix. The mapping 









1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0









⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
.   (34) 











0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0









⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎥×⎥ .   (35) 
 O’Driscoll uses the European standard “little-endian” ordering of bit strings; 
therefore the bits are switched and the inverse of the transform matrix is recalculated to 
match the “big-endian” convention used in this research. The mapping equation in (34) is 
implemented in hardware using the VHDL code in Figure 17. 
variable y: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable c: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
b(3) := y(7) xor y(5) xor y(1); 
b(2) := y(3) xor y(2); 
b(1) := y(7) xor y(6) xor y(4) xor y(1); 
b(0) := y(7) xor y(5); 
c(3) := y(7) xor y(6) xor y(4) xor y(3) xor y(0); 
c(2) := y(6) xor y(2); 
c(1) := y(7) xor y(5) xor y(2) xor y(1); 
c(0) := y(7) xor y(5) xor y(4) xor y(2) xor y(1); 
 
Figure 17. VHDL Code Implementing the Transform Matrix 
The inverse mapping equation in (35) is implemented using the the VHDL code in Figure 
18.  
Using the mapping blocks in Figures 14 and 15 as defined in VHDL in Figures 17 
and 18, the complicated process of modular inversion in GF(24)2 must be implemented. 
Modular inversion is accomplished using VHDL circuits for each block shown in 




variable y: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable c: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
y(7) := b(1) xor b(0) xor c(2) xor c(0); 
y(6) := b(3) xor c(2) xor c(1); 
y(5) := b(1) xor c(2) xor c(0); 
y(4) := c(1) xor c(0); 
y(3) := b(3) xor b(2) xor c(1); 
y(2) := b(3) xor c(1); 
y(1) := b(3) xor b(0); 
y(0) := b(2) xor b(1) xor b(0) xor c(3) xor c(1); 
 
Figure 18. VHDL Code Implementing the Inverse Transform Matrix 
 Figure 16 shows four primary operations: addition, multiplication, squaring, and 
inversion. All of these operations are performed in the subfield GF(24). Since the subfield 
still has a characteristic of 2, addition will remain the same (addition modulo 2). The 
remaining operations require a new reducing polynomial to account for the shift in finite 
fields. Rijmen does not specify a reducing polynomial for the subfield, nor does he 
specify the values of the constants A and B in (31). The reducing polynomial for the 
subfield is denoted as q(x) and the reducing polynomial for the extended field is p(x) 
[Odr01]. Choosing the suitable value for the subfield reducing polynomial was 
investigated extensively by O’Driscoll. Through a method which computes all possible 
cyclotomic cosets over 2 of degree 4 in GF(28) he concluded that there were only three 
choices for a reducing polynomial in the subfield GF(24) [Odr01]. Further, he calculates 
the number of XOR and AND operations required by multiplication in the subfield using 
each of the three possible polynomials and determined the most efficient choice for the 
reducing polynomial q(x) is 
q(x) = x4 + x + 1.              (36) 
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 Now that the subfield reducing polynomial has been established, the extended 
field irreducible, p(x), of the form x2 + Ax + B can be determined. However, p(x) is 
specified only when values for the constants A and B have been chosen. These constants 
represent polynomials in the subfield GF(24). An exhaustive search of the 120 possible 
p(x) polynomials determined that the least number of XOR and AND operations to 
perform multiplication is  
p(x) = x2 + x + β14     (37)  
where β14 is an element of the subfield and is defined by the polynomial x4 + 1 [Odr01]. 
This constant polynomial’s corresponding bit string is {1001}. Therefore the value 
chosen for the constant A in (31) is 1 and the bit string representing the constant B is 
{1001}[Odr01].  
 Given p(x) and q(x), Figure 16 can be implemented in hardware. The 
multiplication operation in the subfield, designated by the⊗operator, can be 
implemented using (36) to perform a multiplication operation of the form c = (a · b) mod 
q(x) where a, b, and c are polynomials. Paar uses this technique to create a so-called Z 
matrix [PaR97]. Multiplication in a subfield using the Z matrix method takes two 
polynomials in GF(24) and applies the Z matrix to either input (the result of the 
multiplication is the same when the Z matrix is applied to either). This multiplication in 
matrix form is  
3 3 0 1 2
2 2 3 0 1 0 2 1
1 1 2 3 0 1 0
0 0 1 2 3 0
c a a a a b
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  (38) 
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where c = (a · b) mod q(x) [PaR97]. Paar’s Z matrix uses a “little-endian” ordering, 
therefore the entire matrix is recalculated to match the “big-endian” convention used in 
this research. Since the elements of the matrix in (38) are not constant, the 
implementation in hardware is not solely XOR operations but must include ANDs as 
well. Multiplying the vector through the matrix in (38) yields the following equations for 
each element of the c vector 
3 3 3 2 0 1 1 0 2
2 3 2 2 3 0 1 1 0 0 2 1
1 3 1 2 2 1 3 0 0 1 0
0 3 0 2 1 1 2 0 3 0
,
( ) ( ) (
( ) ( ),
( )
c b a b a b a b a
c b a b a a b a a b a a
c b a b a b a a b a a
c b a b a b a b a a
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
),
  (39) 
which can be reduced to combinational logic consisting of 2-input AND and XOR gates. 
Equation (39) contains redundant logic in the 3 0( )a a⊕ , 1 0( )a a⊕ , and  terms. 
These can be evaluated once and reused. The VHDL implementations of these are 
designated q, r, and s. The VHDL code in Figure 19 implements multiplication in the 
subfield GF(2
2 1(a a⊕ )
4). 
variable a: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable c: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable q: std_logic; 
variable r: std_logic; 
variable s: std_logic; 
 
q := a(3) xor a(0); 
r := a(1) xor a(0); 
s := a(2) xor a(1); 
 
c(3) := (b(3) and a(3)) xor (b(2) and a(0)) xor (b(1) and a(1)) xor (b(0) and a(2)); 
c(2) := (b(3) and a(2)) xor (b(2) and q) xor (b(1) and r) xor (b(0) and s); 
c(1) := (b(3) and a(1)) xor (b(2) and a(2)) xor (b(1) and q) xor (b(0) and r); 
c(0) := (b(3) and a(0)) xor (b(2) and a(1)) xor (b(1) and a(2)) xor (b(0) and q); 
 
Figure 19. VHDL Implementation of Multiplication in GF(24) 
 The remaining operations in the subfield are squaring and inversion. Squaring in 
the subfield could be implemented using the same polynomial as both inputs in the 
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multiplication function shown above. However, O’Driscoll develops a much more 
computationally efficient method of squaring a polynomial in the subfield. O’Driscoll 
found a constant binary matrix that will, when multiplied with a polynomial’s bit string, 





1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
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⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
    (40) 
where b = a2 [Odr01]. Multiplying the a vector with the constant bit matrix yields the 

















     (41) 
Thus, squaring a polynomial in the subfield can be implemented using only two XOR 
gates. The VHDL code implementing squaring in a subfield is in Figure 20. 
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable b: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
 
b(3) := a(3) xor a(1); 
b(2) := a(1); 
b(1) := a(2) xor a(0); 
b(0) := a(0); 
 
Figure 20. VHDL Implementation of Squaring in GF(24) 
 
 The final operation in the schematic in Figure 16 is modular inversion. The 
Extended Euclidean algorithm method for modular inversion used to generate the table of 
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inverses in GF(28) in Appendix A is the same process as that of determining a table of 
inverses in GF(24), but uses q(x) as the reducing polynomial. If  
a(x) x b(x) = 1 mod q(x)     (42) 
holds, then a(x) is the inverse of b(x) in GF(24) and vice versa. The extended Euclidean 
Algorithm is used to find polynomials that satisfy (42). The subsequent polynomials and 
their inverses are recorded in an 8 byte look up table that can be found in Table 23 in 
Appendix A. 
 With all blocks of the schematic in Figure 16 implemented a VHDL circuit that 
performs the operation of SubBytes in a composite field can be realized. The design 
flows of Figures 14 and 15 summarize the circuit. The complete VHDL code for the 
implementation of SubBytes and inverse SubBytes in a composite field is in Appendix B. 
3.9.2 MixColumns 
3.9.2.1 Half LUT  
Chapter II outlines the baseline MixColumns design Daemen and Rijmen 
specified for an 8-bit platform. The design described below for the MixColumns 
transformation uses a 256 byte look up table containing the values of the xtime operation. 
Xtime takes an 8-bit polynomial and produces the product multiplied by 02 in the 
Rijndael field using l(x) as the reducing polynomial. This table has a property which can 
be exploited to halve the amount of memory required to perform MixColumns. The xtime 
table’s purpose was to avoid performing complex polynomial multiplication modulo the 
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reducing polynomial l(x). Consider, however, an important property of modular 
arithmetic 
x modulo y = x, 0 < x < y.    (43) 
This means when every element of GF(28) is multiplied by 02, half of the elements would 
create a product less than the modulus and (43) could be applied. Careful examination of 
the xtime table shows that half of the table consists of simple multiplication by 02 with 
no modulus operation as indicated by the highlighted portion of Table 10. 
Table 10. Xtime Table: Elements Not Requiring Modulus Reduction Highlighted 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
0 00 02 04 06 08 0A 0C 0E 10 12 14 16 18 1A 1C 1E
1 02 22 24 26 28 2A 2C 2E 30 32 34 36 38 3A 3C 3E
2 40 42 44 46 48 4A 4C 4E 50 52 54 56 58 5A 5C 5E
3 60 62 64 66 68 6A 6C 6E 70 72 74 76 78 7A 7C 7E
4 80 82 84 86 88 8A 8C 8E 90 92 94 96 98 9A 9C 9E
5 A0 A2 A4 A6 A8 AA AC AE B0 B2 B4 B6 B8 BA BC BE
6 C0 C2 C4 C6 C8 CA CC CE D0 D2 D4 D6 D8 DA DC DE
7 E0 E2 E4 E6 E8 EA EC EE F0 F2 F4 F6 F8 FA FC FE
8 1B 19 1F 1D 13 11 17 15 0B 09 0F 0D 03 01 07 05
9 3B 39 3F 3D 33 31 37 35 2B 29 2F 2D 23 21 27 25
A 5B 59 5F 5D 53 51 57 55 4B 49 4F 4D 43 41 47 45
B 7B 79 7F 7D 73 71 77 75 6B 69 6F 6D 63 61 67 65
C 9B 99 9F 9D 93 91 97 95 8B 89 8F 8D 83 81 87 85
D BB B9 BF BD B3 B1 B7 B5 AB A9 AF AD A3 A1 A7 A5
E DB D9 DF DD D3 D1 D7 D5 CB C9 CF CD C3 C1 C7 C5




 Another important property of multiplication by 02 in the Rijndael field is its 
equivalence to multiplying a polynomial by x. This is because the hexadecimal number 
02 is equal to the bit string {00000010} which represents the polynomial x. Any 
polynomial multiplied by x will result in increasing the power of each indeterminate by 
one. The corresponding bit string of the product of any polynomial multiplied by x would 
be the original bit string shifted left by one. Example 7 illustrates this property. 
 Example 7. Evaluate the following expression:  
   






   
Polynomial Representation  Bit String Representation 
 
(x6 + x4 + x2+ x + 1) • x     01010111 • 00000010 
 
= x7 + x5 + x3+ x2 + x   = 10101110 
        
=Bitwise shift to the left! 
 
A bitwise shift to the left is implemented in VHDL below in Figure 21 and simply 
changing the wiring utilizes no hardware resources. 
variable input: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable output: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 
if input < X"80" then 
output := (input(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
end if  
 
Figure 21. VHDL Implementation of the Highlighted Portion of Table 10  
  
The above VHDL circuit effectively implements all highlighted elements of Table 
10, thereby eliminating the need to store these values in memory. This results in a 128 
byte decrease in memory at absolutely no cost (assuming the HDL synthesizer chooses 
not to register the 8 bit value of output). The complete VHDL circuit for this 
MixColumns labeled “Half LUT” can be found in Appendix B. 
3.9.2.2 Arithmetic 
The final design is due to Satyanarayana following an algorithm created by 
Trenholme [Sat04][Wik06a]. Satyanarayana’s implementation is open source VHDL 
code. This design implements MixColumns using no look up tables by implementing the 
xtime function in combinational logic rather than through a LUT. Recall that xtime 
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multiplies an 8-bit polynomial by 02 in the Rijndael field. Thus, a way to multiply two 
polynomials in the Rijndael finite field using only combinational logic is needed and 
Trenholme’s algorithm provides a method for implementing exactly that. Trenholme’s 
algorithm for multiplying two polynomials in the Rijndael finite field is concisely 
described and has the following steps [Wik06a] 
• Take two eight-bit numbers, a and b, and an eight-bit product p.  
• Set the product to zero.  
• Make a copy of a and b, which will be called a and b for the rest of this algorithm  
• Run the following loop eight times:  
1. If the low bit of b is set, XOR the product p by the value of a  
2. Keep track of whether the high (leftmost) bit of a is set to one  
3. Rotate a one bit to the left, discarding the high bit, and making the low bit 
have a value of zero  
4. If a's high bit had a value of one prior to this rotation, XOR a with the 
hexadecimal number 0x1b (27 in decimal). 0x1b corresponds to the 
irreducible polynomial x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1.  
5. Rotate b one bit to the right, discarding the low bit, and making the high 
(leftmost) bit have a value of zero.  
• The product p now has the product of a and b  
Trenholme’s algorithm is designed for two 8-bit numbers to be multiplied in the 
Rijndael field, which means the algorithm’s loop must be run eight times. If one of the 
input polynomials were to be held at a constant level of 02 then the loop would only have 
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to be run once and steps 1 and 5 of the loop (highlighted above) could be eliminated. The 
VHDL code in Figure 22 was written by Satyanarayana and effectively implements the 
xtime function in combinational logic. 
-- Copyright (C) 2004 Author (Satyanarayana) 
variable input: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable output: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
    
    if(p(0)(7) = '1') then 
       m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
    else 
       m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
    end if; 
 
Figure 22. VHDL Implementation of xtime in Combinational Logic 
This xtime process was created to take advantage of the fact that all elements of 
the Rijndael finite field can be written as a sum of powers of 02 since the characteristic of 
the Rijndael finite field is 2 (cf., Example 6, Chapter II). The VHDL function in Figure 
23 by Satyanarayana, with comments added, implements the column transform routine on 
an input array p consisting of four 8-bit elements (i.e., a column of the 4x4 state matrix). 
The procedure in Figure 23 is extended for the inverse MixColumns transform 
(cf., Chapter II). The complete VHDL code for the MixColumns Arithmetic design can 
be found in Appendix B.  
-- Copyright (C) 2004 Author (Satyanarayana) 
function col_transform(p: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector is 
 variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 variable m,n: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 begin  
 
--Multiply by 02 in Rijndael field 
   if(p(0)(7) = '1') then 
     m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
   else 
     m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
   end if; 
  
--Multiply by 03 by performing xtime and then XORing with p(1) 
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   if(p(1)(7) = '1') then 
     n := (p(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011" xor p(1); 
   else 
     n := (p(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor p(1); 
   end if; 
 
--Bytes p(2) and p(3) require no processing since they are multiplied  
-- by 01 as specified in Chapter II equation (18) 
   result := m xor n xor p(2) xor p(3); 
   return result; 
end function col_transform; 
 
Figure 23. VHDL Implementation of the Column Transform Routine 
3.10 Evaluation Technique 
The NIST Algorithm Validation Suite is the result of the findings of an analytical 
evaluation of AES by NIST. The evaluation of a candidate implementation is verified 
using the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite’s Known Answer Test. AES is a substitution 
cipher; so, if the same block of data is run through the algorithm multiple times with the 
same key, the output ciphertext will be exactly the same each time. The Known Answer 
Test takes advantage of this and provides an easy method of determining the functionality 
of a particular AES implementation. This method uses look up tables containing known 
answer values given an input key and plaintext (i.e., validation against analytic analysis). 
The experiment testing environment consists of an HDL module which contains 
the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. This module provides the workload and key entry 
for the data encryption system. The internal signals of the data encryption system is 
monitored using the Xilinx software package ChipScope. A separate HDL module 
implements the actual data encryption system which is monitored via ChipScope. Most of 
the testing environment is localized to the FPGA chip. The FPGA sends the input/output 
data to two separate pins on the Xilinx board such that they can be viewed on a computer 
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running the ChipScope software. ChipScope verifies the maximum clock frequency 
dictated by the critical path found by the HDL synthesizer using an iterative process by 
which the frequency of the system clock is increased by 0.01 MHZ until the output of the 
data encryption system does not pass the known answer test as defined by the validation 
suite. Area Occupied is measured by the Xilinx XST HDL synthesis software. After the 
software finishes synthesizing the VHDL code and routes all logic blocks, the total 
number of gates (including memory) required to implement the design is given in the 
synthesis report. Figure 24 is a block diagram outlining the testing environment.  
3.11 Experimental Design 
There are three factors in each experiment (SubBytes design, MixColumns 
Design, and Synthesis goal). The two transformation factors (SubBytes and MixColumns 
design) each have three different levels (cf., Table 9). The Synthesis goal factor has two 
levels (area and speed). The total number of factors and their levels require 32 • 21 or 18 
different experiments for each algorithm in order to account for every possible 
combination of factors and levels. After each experiment is run, values for all three 
metrics are recorded. For example, the first experiment implements the baseline AES 
design on the FPGA and runs the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. Values for all 
metrics (throughput, area efficiency, area occupied) are recorded after the suite has been 
completed. Each subsequent experiment is a permutation of experimental factor levels. 
The expected variance of the data is minimal, meaning it is assumed that the performance 
of the system given the same design, workload, and HDL compilation will have similar 




Figure 24. Block Diagram of Testing Environment 
3.12 Methodology Summary 
This research has two primary goals; to optimize the AES algorithm’s 
performance based on the chosen metrics and to answer the following questions: How 
does each factor of optimization interact and affect the overall values of each 
optimization metric, and how does each SubBytes and MixColumns design affect 
performance with respect to the full factorial design? The metrics are throughput, area 
efficiency, and area occupied. These questions are investigated by controlling the level of 
the following three factors: SubBytes design, MixColumns design, and Synthesis Goal. 
The approach used to satisfy the two goals of the research uses a variety of SubBytes and 
MixColumns designs to analyze the performance based on the three metrics with respect 
to the baseline AES design for an 8-bit processor.  
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The system under test is called the data encryption system and consists of HDL 
modules, the AES algorithm, and an FPGA board. A functional implementation of this 
system provides a properly encrypted data stream of a defined workload, which in this 
experiment is the NIST Algorithm Validation Suite. This system is evaluated by 
performing multiple experiments on multiple system designs and measuring values for 
the performance metrics. These measurements are validated by comparing them to the 
findings of the analysis provided by the validation suite.
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents and interprets the data collected from executing the 
experiment outlined in Chapter III. The goal of this chapter is to answer the investigative 
research questions posed in Chapter III: (1) how do experimental factors interact and 
affect the overall performance metrics, and (2) how does each SubBytes and 
MixColumns design affect performance? A tabular summary and graphs are used to give 
a quick overview of the raw data. The data is then examined through an analysis of 
means. Finally the percentage of variation explained by each factor and their interactions 
is determined through an analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis allows the effects 
to be sorted and the most important effects and interactions identified.  
4.2 Results of Experimental Scenarios and Literature Comparison 
Total equivalent gate count and maximum clock frequency data from all 
experimental scenarios are summarized in Table 11. This data is represented graphically 
in Figures 25, 26 and 27. The theoretical maximum clock frequency matched the 
measured clock frequency to 1 kHz. Using this data, throughput, area occupied, and 
subsequently area efficiency are calculated. The number of clock cycles required to 
encrypt a block of data for all designs is 12. The highlighted values are the maximum 
(minimum) values obtained by this research. Table 11 reflects only one replication of 
each experiment. Pilot studies using two different methods were used to generate 
multiple replications of the experiment and neither method resulted in any significant 
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variance in the data. The first method cleared the FPGA and then reprogrammed it using 
the already synthesized design and recorded values for the metrics. It was expected that 
data for the exact same design re-implemented on the FPGA (using the same workload) 
had little variation. The second method for generating replications re-synthesized the 
VHDL circuit and programmed the FPGA using the re-synthesized design. The size of 
the .BIT files of the re-synthesized designs vary by no more than ±87 bits compared to 
the original. So, there was some difference but no variation in the data resulted. This was 
expected because the synthesizer is creating a design based on the same VHDL 
definition. The reason the .BIT files are different is due to the synthesizer, but did not 
affect the circuit produced.  
Table 11. Summary of Experimental Data 
Max Freq  (MHz) Eq Gate Ct Throughput (kbps) Area Efficiency
Full LUT Full LUT 53.714 156616.000 572949.333 3.658
Full LUT Half LUT 82.747 113742.000 882634.667 7.760
Full LUT Arithmetic 87.524 109456.000 933589.333 8.529
Extended Field Inversion Full LUT 56.459 121384.000 602229.333 4.961
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT 82.912 51500.000 884394.667 17.173
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic 81.880 50289.000 873386.667 17.367
Composite Field Inversion Full LUT 52.151 108382.000 556277.333 5.133
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT 70.057 33916.000 747274.667 22.033
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic 69.955 33973.000 746186.667 21.964
Max Freq (MHz) Eq Gate Ct Throughput (bps) Area Efficiency
Full LUT Full LUT 36.688 154176.000 391338.667 2.538
Full LUT Half LUT 52.260 89799.000 557440.000 6.208
Full LUT Arithmetic 48.483 90516.000 517152.000 5.713
Extended Field Inversion Full LUT 49.584 106617.000 528896.000 4.961
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT 69.737 43722.000 743861.333 17.013
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic 64.748 44850.000 690645.333 15.399
Composite Field Inversion Full LUT 36.945 91353.000 394080.000 4.314
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT 47.039 29049.000 501749.333 17.273








The smallest area occupied uses 29,049 total equivalent gates using the 
Composite Field Inversion SubBytes design, Half LUT MixColumns design, and a 
Synthesis Goal of area. Since the Composite Field Inversion design for SubBytes is the 
design that uses the least amount of memory, the fact that the overall AES design 
achieves the smallest area occupied is expected. The Half LUT MixColumns design uses 
128 bytes of memory, whereas the Arithmetic design uses no look-up table. The reason 
the Half LUT MixColumns design results in the AES design achieving the lowest total 
area occupied is because the sheer amount of combinational logic required to perform the 
complex finite field arithmetic for the MixColumns transform. The logic required for the 
combinational logic design outweighs the memory required for the Half LUT design. It is 
also expected that the smallest design would be achieved by synthesizing for area. The 
smallest area found in current research occupies an estimated 41,184 total equivalent 
gates [GoB05]. Thus, the design developed in this research occupies 29.5% less space.  
The largest area efficiency (including memory) achieved by this research is 
22.033 for the Composite Field Inversion SubBytes design, Half LUT MixColumns 
design, and Synthesis Goal of speed. Since the area efficiency metric is obtained by 
dividing throughput by area, a sound strategy is to keep the area occupied figure low. It is 
no surprise that the SubBytes and MixColumns designs used to generate the lowest total 
area occupied for the overall AES algorithm (Composite Field Inversion and Half LUT) 
are responsible for achieving the lowest area efficiency. The only difference in the factor 
levels used to produce the lowest total area and the highest area efficiency is that the 
HDL synthesizer’s goal for high area efficiency is speed rather than area. This is a vast 
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improvement over the 2.30 obtained by Chodowiec & Gaj. These results are estimates 
because the total area occupied as reported in current research is specified in CLBs or 
slices. Converting CLBs or slices to total equivalent gate count used the conversion factor 
described in Chapter II (22). This transformation is based on logic capabilities published 
by the manufacturer of the device and does not account for the specific design or 
implementation considerations such as routing. Furthermore, this estimate also assumes 
that all slices or CLBs are completely occupied by relevant logic, which may or may not 


























































































Individual Values for Throughput
 
Figure 25. Individual Values Plot for Throughput 
The maximum throughput achieved is about 934 Mbps for the Full LUT SubBytes 
design, Arithmetic MixColumns design, and Speed Synthesis Goal. The Full LUT 
SubBytes design results in highest throughput since in the Full LUT design the entire 
SubBytes transform is reduced to a single table look-up. Arithmetic MixColumns design 
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is faster than the LUT table MixColumns design is because the LUT design, unlike the 
SubBytes Full LUT design, requires combinational logic as well as a table look-up. The 
gate delay involved with performing the MixColumns transformation entirely through 
combinational logic (i.e., Arithmetic design) is not as large as the latency required to 
































































































Individual Values for Area Occupied
 
Figure 26. Individual Values Plot for Area Occupied 
 
Although the maximum throughput achieved by this research is not close to the 
maximum throughput obtained by Good of 23.5 Gbps, the objective of this research was 
to maximize area efficiency, not speed. Thus, this research used methods that reduced the 
memory required to complete the transformations. This limits design goals solely to the 
correct operation of AES and not to the hardware responsible for implementing it. For 
example, pipelining was not used even though the fastest current implementation is 
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pipelined because pipelining has no impact on the correct functioning of AES. Another 
powerful method for increasing throughput at the hardware level is loop unrolling. Loop 
























































































Individual Values for Area Efficiency
 
Figure 27. Individual Values Plot for Area Efficiency 
The individual values plots shown in Figures 25, 26 and 27 show the highest and 
lowest values obtained for each metric. Figure 25 shows that the design with the slowest 
throughput is the baseline AES design for an 8-bit processor (Full LUT designs for both 
SubBytes and MixColumns) synthesized for area. Since the HDL synthesizer has a goal 
of area, it does not route the design to reduce the latency required for a table look-up. The 
baseline AES design uses table look-ups as its primary means of operation, and this 
coupled with the high latency attributed to LUT designs synthesized for area explains the 
slow throughput value for this particular design. 
72 
 
Figure 26 shows the largest (highest area occupied) overall AES design is the 
baseline AES design for an 8-bit platform synthesized for speed. One of the goals of this 
research is to improve the performance of the baseline AES design. This goal was 
achieved by reducing the design’s dependence on look-up tables and memory. The 
design’s large area can be attributed to its three 256 byte look-up tables coupled with 
synthesizing for speed.  
4.3 Analysis of the Data 
The individual values plots shown in Figures 25, 26 and 27 illustrate the 
performance of individual AES designs, but they do not reveal how individual 
experimental factors and their associated levels affect the performance metrics. Through 
the analysis of the baseline experimental design outlined in Chapter III it is possible to 
associate individual factor levels and assess their impact on performance. A visual 
analysis of the data is accomplished using main effects plots. This provides insight into 
the first research goal that is to determine how each factor level affects the performance 
of the design as a whole. It does not, however, address the second goal, which is to 
quantify the interactions of the factors and explain how these interactions affect the 
system as a whole. An analysis of an ANOVA table will aid in quantifying the main 
effects of each factor and, more importantly, their interactions. The interactions are 
quantified as percentages of variation explained by each factor. The final product of this 
analysis is an enumeration the significance of each factor and interaction. 
73 
 
 4.3.1 Visual Analysis of Means 
 The first step in evaluating the data is to visually determine how each factor level 
impacts the performance of the system using the chosen metrics. The first factor to be 
analyzed is SubBytes design. The main effects plot in Figure 28 shows the Full LUT 
design drastically increases the total area occupied. The graph in Figure 28 shows the 
mean of the gate count attributed to the Extended Field Inversion design is roughly half 
of the gates required to implement the Full LUT design. This makes intuitive sense 
because Extended Field Inversion is intended to halve the amount of memory required by 
the Full LUT design by reducing the required amount of look-up tables from two 256 





























Main Effects Plot for SubBytes' Impact on Area Occupied
 




Figure 29 indicates that the Composite Field Inversion design has the lowest mean 
throughput of the three designs tested. This is because of the complexity of the 
combinational logic required to implement the entire SubBytes transform using a single 
64 bit LUT. What is surprising is that the mean throughput of Extended Field Inversion is 
higher than simply using the Full LUT design. This is linked to the percentage of 
variation explained by each design. This will become clearer once the ANOVA results 
are presented. Figure 29 also shows that the Extended Field Inversion design, which 
blends combinational logic and one 256 byte LUT, has a higher mean throughput than the 

























Main Effects Plot for SubBytes' Impact on Throughput
 
Figure 29. Main Effects Plot for SubBytes on Throughput 
The mean area efficiency of the Full LUT design for SubBytes is by far the lowest 
shown in Figure 30. Thus, the additional throughput value of a Full LUT SubBytes 
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design does not come close to justifying its large memory consumption (512 bytes). The 
SubBytes design which makes the best use of the area it occupies is Composite Field 
Inversion. This design boasts such a small total equivalent gate count that its subsequent 
reduction in throughput does not significantly impact its efficiency. It must also be noted 
that the area efficiency of the Extended Field Inversion design is similar to Composite 


























Main Effects Plot for SubBytes' Impact on Area Efficiency
 
Figure 30. Main Effects Plot for SubBytes on Area Efficiency 
The additional computational complexity of the Arithmetic MixColumns design is 
what makes the design’s area occupied almost equivalent to that of the Half LUT design, 
as shown in Figure 31. Figure 31 also shows the Half LUT design, which was to halve 
the amount of memory required by the full factorial design, does indeed do so. What is 
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interesting is that, on average, the Half LUT and the Arithmetic designs require about the 
same amount of equivalent gates even though the Arithmetic design uses only 
combinational logic while the Half LUT design uses one 128 byte LUT as well as 
combinational logic. This is because the hardware required to implement the LUT 
entirely in combinational logic, as is the intention of the Arithmetic design, approaches 






























Main Effects Plot for MixColumns Design's Impact on Area Occupied
 
Figure 31. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Area Occupied 
The results obtained in Figure 32 for the MixColumns design’s impact on 
throughput are similar to those observed for SubBytes’ effect on throughput in Figure 29. 
The average throughput for the MixColumns LUT design is the lowest of the three, while 
the Half LUT design obtained the highest throughput with the Arithmetic design 
achieving a throughput comparable to the Half LUT design. Just as with the SubBytes 
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designs, the designs tested for MixColumns encompass the entire spectrum of design 






















Main Effects Plot for MixColumn Design's Impact on Throughput
 
Figure 32. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Throughput 
Memory latency again proves to be a weakness of the LUT design. The Half LUT 
design requires a table look-up on half of the values operated on. This halves the amount 
of memory latency associated with table look-ups and thus increases the overall average 
throughput of the design. The throughput obtained by the Arithmetic design is 
comparable to the Half LUT because the combinational logic delay associated with the 
complex mathematical operations the Arithmetic design must execute is similar to the 
memory latency associated with a table look-up on half of the values operated on.  
The average effects of MixColumns design on area efficiency are summarized in 
Figure 33. This figure shows how inefficient the full factorial MixColumns LUT design 
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is compared to the other two options. The average area efficiency performance of both 
the Arithmetic and Half LUT designs are above 14, whereas the baseline design specified 
by Daemen and Rijmen for an 8-bit processor is below one third of that. The full factorial 
LUT design for MixColumns occupies the most area and achieves the slowest 




















Main Effects Plot for MixColumns Design's Impact on Area Efficiency
 
Figure 33. Main Effects Plot for MixColumns on Area Efficiency 
The best average area efficiency is obtained through the Half LUT design. This 
design is successful because it allows half of the full factorial LUT to be reduced to a 
simple bitwise shift. This shift is accomplished through the changes in wiring and halves 
the memory required from the full factorial design at the cost of a mere 8-bit register.  
The main effects plot in Figure 34 illustrates the positive impact synthesizing a 
VHDL design for speed has on throughput. This is expected. It is assumed that 
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synthesizing for speed comes at a cost, namely an increase in area. This raises an 
interesting question as to whether the increase in throughput as a result of synthesizing 





















Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal's Impact on Throughput
 
Figure 34. Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal on Throughput 
Figure 35 shows that synthesizing for speed does, in fact, increase the average 
area occupied by a design, thus proving the above supposition. But the answer to the 
question as to whether the increase in throughput as a result of synthesis for speed is 
worth the cost of an increase in average area occupied is given in Figure 36. Figure 36 
shows that synthesis for speed increases the average area efficiency, which means that the 
synthesis goal of speed will, on average, increase a design’s ability to efficiently use its 
available hardware resources. Thus, the increase in throughput resulting from synthesis 





























Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal's Impact on Area Occupied
 




















Main Effects Plot for Synthesis Goal's Impact on Area Efficiency
 




4.4 Performance Analysis through ANOVA  
The analysis of the data in Table 11 through visual analysis of means, as 
presented above, indicates how each factor individually affects the average performance 
of the entire AES system, but it does not reveal how the factors interact to affect the 
performance metrics. Through an ANOVA it is possible to determine which factor is 
responsible for the most variance in each performance metric and consequently which 
factor level is most suitable when optimizing AES for a particular performance metric.  
 4.4.1 ANOVA for Throughput 
The data in Table 11 is analyzed by MINITAB’s Analyze Factorial Design feature 
for a three factor General Factorial Design. MINITAB’s output for the Balanced 
ANOVA for throughput is reproduced in Table 12. 
Table 12. Analysis of Variance Table for Throughput  
Source                              DF       Seq SS       Adj SS       Adj MS 
SubBytes Design                      2  67861330654  67861330654  33930665327 
MixColumns Design                    2  1.68976E+11  1.68976E+11  84487864855 
Synthesis Goal                       1  2.21800E+11  2.21800E+11  2.21800E+11 
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design    4   8597865719   8597865719   2149466430 
SubBytes Design*Synthesis Goal       2  23149318959  23149318959  11574659480 
MixColumns Design*Synthesis Goal     2  17579150621  17579150621   8789575310 
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design*   4   2696989634   2696989634    674247408 
  Synthesis Goal 
Error                                0            *            *            * 
Total                               17  5.10661E+11 
 
Table 12 displays the Sum of Squares values, the Adjusted Sum of Squares, and 
the Mean Square Values. Most notably the values of Error for all three columns is zero 
since the experiment has only one replication, therefore no error can be calculated. The 
output of MINITAB’s Factorial Design Analysis also includes a quantification of the 
main effects as shown in Table 13. Note the difference in terminology, what this research 




The quantification of the effects, as shown in Table 13 are raw values, the 
magnitudes of which can be used to determine which factors have the most overall 
impact on throughput. An easier method of determining the impact of factors on 
throughput is through a simple calculation using the ANOVA Table in Table 12. This 
method divides the each Sum of Squares (SS) value in Table 12 by the total SS value, 
thus providing a percent of variation explained by each factor and interaction. The results 
of this are summarized in Table 14. 
Table 13. Quantification of Effects for Throughput 
                                                                SE 
Term                                             Coef  Coef  T  P 
Constant                                       644430     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des 
Composite Field Inversion                    -74225.8     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion                      76138.7     *  *  * 
MixColumns D 
Arithmetic                                    61672.9     *  *  * 
Half LUT                                      75128.9     *  *  * 
Synthesis Go 
Area                                          -111006     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D 
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic         -20954.7     *  *  * 
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT           -20821.3     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic          -225.778     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT             18430.2     *  *  * 
 
SubBytes Des*Synthesis Go 
Composite Field Inversion Area               -2036.15     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Area                 44904.3     *  *  * 
MixColumns D*Synthesis Go 
Arithmetic   Area                            -33945.5     *  *  * 
Half LUT     Area                            -7536.59     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D*Synthesis Go 
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic   Area   11723.3     *  *  * 
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT     Area  -2184.30     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic   Area    8676.15     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT     Area    3371.26     *  *  * 
 
Table 14 shows that Synthesis Goal is responsible for 43.43% of the variance in 
throughput data. This indicates that the factor that influences throughput the most is 
Synthesis Goal. The next most important factor is MixColumns design, which is 
responsible for 33.09% of throughput variation. Table 14 concludes that the interaction of 
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factors does not account for as much percentage of variance for throughput as the 
individual factors themselves, for the highest interaction percentage is 4.53% (interaction 
of SubBytes Design and Synthesis Goal) and the lowest individual factor percentage is 
13.29% (SubBytes Design).  
Table 14. Percentage of Variance Explained for Throughput 
 Sum of Squares 
% Variance 
Explained 
SubBytes Design 67861330654 13.29
MixColumns Design 1.68976E+11 33.09
Synthesis Goal 2.218E+11 43.43
SubBytes * MixColumns 8597865719 1.68
SubBytes * Synthesis Goal 23149318959 4.53
MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 17579150621 3.44
SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 2696989634 0.53
Total 5.10661E+11  
 
 Table 15 ranks each factor and interaction in descending order of importance as 
defined by percentage of variation explained. 
Table 15. Order of Importance for Throughput’s Factors and Interactions  
Importance Factor 
1 Synthesis Goal 
2 MixColumns Design 
3 SubBytes Design 
4 SubBytes * Synthesis Goal 
5 MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 
6 SubBytes * MixColumns 
7 SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 
4.4.2 ANOVA for Area Occupied 
Doing a similar analysis on area occupied yields Table 16. The MINITAB output 
for the balanced ANOVA for area occupied is reproduced in Table 25 in Appendix C and 
the quantification of the main effects table is summarized in Table 26 in Appendix C. 
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Table 16 summarizes the percentages of variance explained by each factor and interaction 
for area occupied. 
Table 16. Percentage of Variance Explained for Area Occupied 
  Sum of Squares 
% Variance 
Explained 
SubBytes Design 13700255055 44.86
MixColumns Design 15902640562 52.07
Synthesis Goal 550544684 1.80
SubBytes * MixColumns 150371320 0.49
SubBytes * Synthesis Goal 37100094 0.12
MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 5430919 0.02
SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 196245452 0.64
Total 30542588085   
 
 Table 16 shows that MixColumns Design is responsible for 52.07% of the 
variance in total equivalent gate count. This indicates that the factor which influences 
area occupied the most is MixColumns Design. The next most important factor is 
SubBytes Design and is responsible for 44.86% of total equivalent gate count variation. 
The full ordering of each factor and interaction is shown in Table 17. It is surprising that 
MixColumns Design is responsible for more variation in area occupied than SubBytes 
since alternative SubBytes designs eliminated the need for more memory than alternative 
MixColumns Designs.  
The full factorial SubBytes design requires 512 bytes of memory while the least 
memory consuming SubBytes design requires 64 bits of memory, thus reducing the 
original design’s memory usage by 508 bytes. The full factorial MixColumns requires 
256 bytes of memory while the Arithmetic design requires no memory to execute, thus 
saving a total of 256 bytes of memory. The reason MixColumns still accounts for more 
variance in total equivalent gate count is because the combinational logic needed for 
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reducing the memory requirements of the baseline SubBytes design is much more 
complicated than reducing the full factorial MixColumns design. This large requirement 
for logic across all designs of SubBytes is why the variance in area for MixColumns due 
to this factor is so small. Table 16 reveals that the interaction of factors accounts for little 
variance in total equivalent gate count, for the highest interaction percentage is only 0.64 
(interaction of SubBytes, MixColumns, and Synthesis Goal).  
Table 17. Order of Importance for Area Occupied’s Factors and Interactions 
Importance Factor 
1 MixColumns Design 
2 SubBytes Design 
3 Synthesis Goal 
4 SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 
5 SubBytes * MixColumns 
6 SubBytes * Synthesis Goal 
7 MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 
 4.4.3 ANOVA on Area Efficiency 
Performing a similar analysis on area efficiency yields Table 18. The MINITAB 
output for the Balanced ANOVA for area occupied is reproduced in Table 27 in 
Appendix C and the quantification of the main effects table is summarized in Table 28 in 
Appendix C. Table 18 summarizes the percentages of variance explained by each factor 
and interaction for area efficiency. 
The hypothesis that MixColumns will produce a large percentage of variation 
explained due to the large magnitudes of MixColumns effects is confirmed by Table 18. 
The percentage of variation explained by the factor MixColumns Design is 52.11% and is 
larger than any other factor or interaction. This makes intuitive sense because 
MixColumns Design is responsible for the most variation in area occupied and the second 
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most variation in throughput. Since area efficiency is related to both throughput and area 
occupied, it would make sense that MixColumns should be responsible for a large 
amount of variation in area efficiency. 
Table 18. Percentage of Variance Explained for Area Efficiency 
  Sum of Squares 
% Variance 
Explained 
SubBytes Design 257.976 32.82
MixColumns Design 409.585 52.11
Sythesis Goal 20.278 2.58
SubBytes * MixColumns 81.639 10.39
SubBytes * Synthesis Goal 7.496 0.95
MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 6.39 0.81
SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 2.71 0.34
Total 786.074  
 
 Table 18 shows the first instance of an interaction being more significant to 
variation than an individual factor. The interaction of SubBytes Design and MixColumns 
Design is responsible for 10.39% of variance in area efficiency which is much greater 
than the percentage explained by the individual factor of Synthesis Goal (2.58%).  This 
can be attributed to the observations evident in Figures 34 and 35. That is, synthesizing 
for area decreases average throughput while synthesizing for speed increases average 
area. Since area efficiency relates both throughput and area occupied, these observations 
offset each other and results in a small percentage of variance attributed to Synthesis 
Goal. Therefore since individually, MixColumns Design and SubBytes Design share a 
large percentage of variation explained and the interaction of these two factors should 
have a large impact on variation for area efficiency as well. The ordering of importance 
for each factor and interaction is shown in Table 19. 
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Table 19. Order of Importance for Area Efficiency’s Factors and Interactions 
Importance Factor 
1 MixColumns Design 
2 SubBytes Design 
3 SubBytes * MixColumns 
4 Sythesis Goal 
5 SubBytes * Synthesis Goal 
6 MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 
7 SubBytes * MixColumns * Synthesis Goal 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter shows that the baseline SubBytes and MixColumns designs (i.e., Full 
LUT designs) always perform poorly in area efficiency and area occupied. The only 
design to produce a lower performance than the baseline Full LUT design for any metric 
is the SubBytes design Composite Field Inversion, which produced a lower throughput 
than the baseline design. Composite Field Inversion has the highest area efficiency of the 
three SubBytes design, thus justifying the reduction in throughput for more efficient area 
usage. MixColumns Design and Synthesis Goal are responsible for the largest variance in 




V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the analysis of experimental 
data. This chapter also highlights the significance of this work and its impact on current 
research methods involving the implementation of AES on FPGAs, as well as provides 
recommendations for future research in this area.  
5.2 Significance of Research 
The significance of this research is three-fold. This research establishes a method 
of comparing AES FPGA implementations across FPGAs independent of chip family or 
manufacturer by normalizing measures of area. This research also provides an in depth 
analysis of design considerations for AES implementations on 8-bit processing platforms. 
Finally, this research compares the performance of each AES transformation design 
implementation as a part of the AES system as a whole, rather than as its own separate 
entity. 
The trend in current research for specific AES transformations (i.e., designs for 
SubBytes, MixColumns, KeyExpansion, AddRoundKey, or ShiftRows) is to implement a 
design independent of the AES algorithm and compare the result to some baseline 
transformation. This method, essentially, takes an incremental step in a process and treats 
the individual transformation as its own system. The problem with this approach is that it 
ignores the impact the new design may have on the algorithm as a whole. This research 
addresses this issue by assessing the impact of each new transformation as a part of the 
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overall AES system, which allows a more comprehensive perspective on how the new 
transformation affects the algorithm as a whole. 
The state of current research to minimize area occupied is summed up best by 
Zambreno: “It is difficult to make direct comparisons between FPGA implementations of 
any algorithm since the specific hardware target is often different” [ZCN04]. This 
research addresses this concern by proposing a way to estimate the area occupied by an 
implementation independent of manufacturer or chip family using a conversion factor 
(cf., Chapter II (22) ). Area occupied is measured in terms of total equivalent gate count 
rather than CLBs or slices. Comparing gate count rather than CLB or slice count 
eliminates the specific hardware target’s architecture from consideration because the 
number of gates required to implement a design on any hardware platform is measured 
using the same units, whereas the number of CLB or slices required to implement a 
design is a function of the specific hardware target. 
Research that has examined throughput, area, or efficiency of AES 
implementations often does so with no consideration to the usefulness of the design in 
practice, especially if they assume the availability of a 32-bit processor. Most 
implementations of AES requiring a small area also have a correspondingly small 
processing capability (e.g., smart card). This research realistically assumes an 8-bit 
processing capability. The importance of this constraint is so significant that the 
designers of AES incorporated into their specification of the algorithm a separate design 
intended to perform well on an 8-bit platform. This research succeeds in its goal of 
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increasing the performance of this constrained AES design based on the metrics of 
throughput, area occupied, and area efficiency.  
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
Future AES transformation designs are possible. Some examples include a 
SubBytes design that uses no table look-ups, which can be accomplished by reducing the 
64 bit LUT associated with Composite Field Inversion to combinational logic by 
reducing the composite field GF(24)2 to the field GF((22)2)2 . Since this experiment 
concentrated on design considerations at the algorithmic level, future research could also 
carry out a similar performance analysis on designs targeting the hardware level using 
optimization techniques such as loop unrolling, pipelining, and speculation.  
The process of mapping GF(28) to the composite field GF(24)2 could be expanded 
to research work being done in GF(216). Through further research, operations in GF(216) 
could be reduced to the composite field GF(28)2, which could be reduced again to the 
composite field GF((24)2)2.  
5.4 Conclusions of Research 
This research has two primary goals, the first of which is to improve the 
performance of the baseline design of AES targeting an 8-bit platform based on the 
chosen metrics. The second goal of this research is to quantify how each factor interacts 
and affects the overall values of each metric and to identify which factors are responsible 
for the largest variance in performance of the AES algorithm measured in throughput, 




The first goal is accomplished through the visual analysis of means plots shown in 
Chapter IV (cf., Figures 28-36). These plots show that the baseline SubBytes and 
MixColumns designs (i.e., Full LUT designs) are always the poorest performers in area 
efficiency and area occupied. The only design to produce a lower performance than the 
baseline Full LUT design for any metric is the SubBytes design Composite Field 
Inversion, which produced a lower throughput than the baseline design. Figure 30 shows 
Composite Field Inversion has the highest area efficiency of the three SubBytes design, 
thus justifying the reduction in throughput for more efficient area usage. Thus, the first 
goal of improving the performance of the baseline design of AES targeting an 8-bit 
platform is achieved. 
The second research goal is to determine how each factor interacts and affects the 
overall values of each metric. This is accomplished through the identification of which 
factors are responsible for the largest variance in performance of the AES algorithm 
measured in throughput, area efficiency, and area occupied by quantifying the percentage 
of variance attributed to each factor. Table 15 identifies the factor most responsible for 
affecting throughput is Synthesis Goal. Tables 17 and 19 identify that the factor most 
responsible for variance in both area efficiency and area occupied is MixColumns design. 
This research also contributes a method of estimating area as a measure of total 
equivalent gate count. This method allows a direct comparison to be made between two 
FPGA implementations independent of manufacturer or chip family. Thus, this research 
meets both research goals and answers both investigative questions posed through a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data collected through experimentation. 
 
Appendix A: Data Tables 
Table 20. Modular Inverses in the Rijndael Field [Odr01] 
 
 





Table 22. Inverse S-Box Look-Up Table [Odr01] 
 
 
























Table 24. Tabular Representation of xtime  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
0 00 02 04 06 08 0A 0C 0E 10 12 14 16 18 1A 1C 1E
1 02 22 24 26 28 2A 2C 2E 30 32 34 36 38 3A 3C 3E
2 40 42 44 46 48 4A 4C 4E 50 52 54 56 58 5A 5C 5E
3 60 62 64 66 68 6A 6C 6E 70 72 74 76 78 7A 7C 7E
4 80 82 84 86 88 8A 8C 8E 90 92 94 96 98 9A 9C 9E
5 A0 A2 A4 A6 A8 AA AC AE B0 B2 B4 B6 B8 BA BC BE
6 C0 C2 C4 C6 C8 CA CC CE D0 D2 D4 D6 D8 DA DC DE
7 E0 E2 E4 E6 E8 EA EC EE F0 F2 F4 F6 F8 FA FC FE
8 1B 19 1F 1D 13 11 17 15 0B 09 0F 0D 03 01 07 05
9 3B 39 3F 3D 33 31 37 35 2B 29 2F 2D 23 21 27 25
A 5B 59 5F 5D 53 51 57 55 4B 49 4F 4D 43 41 47 45
B 7B 79 7F 7D 73 71 77 75 6B 69 6F 6D 63 61 67 65
C 9B 99 9F 9D 93 91 97 95 8B 89 8F 8D 83 81 87 85
D BB B9 BF BD B3 B1 B7 B5 AB A9 AF AD A3 A1 A7 A5
E DB D9 DF DD D3 D1 D7 D5 CB C9 CF CD C3 C1 C7 C5

































Appendix B: Complete VHDL Code for Each Design 
SubBytes Full LUT 
--Copyright (C) 2004 Hemanth Satyanarayana 
 
--This function implements the S-Box LUT   
function sbox_val(address: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return 
std_logic_vector is 
variable data: bit_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable data_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
case address is 
 
  when "00000000" => data := X"63"; 
  when "00000001" => data := X"7C"; 
  when "00000010" => data := X"77"; 
  when "00000011" => data := X"7B"; 
  when "00000100" => data := X"F2"; 
  when "00000101" => data := X"6B"; 
  when "00000110" => data := X"6F"; 
  when "00000111" => data := X"C5"; 
  when "00001000" => data := X"30"; 
  when "00001001" => data := X"01"; 
  when "00001010" => data := X"67"; 
  when "00001011" => data := X"2B"; 
  when "00001100" => data := X"FE"; 
  when "00001101" => data := X"D7"; 
  when "00001110" => data := X"AB"; 
  when "00001111" => data := X"76"; 
  when "00010000" => data := X"CA"; 
  when "00010001" => data := X"82"; 
  when "00010010" => data := X"C9"; 
  when "00010011" => data := X"7D"; 
  when "00010100" => data := X"FA"; 
  when "00010101" => data := X"59"; 
  when "00010110" => data := X"47"; 
  when "00010111" => data := X"F0"; 
  when "00011000" => data := X"AD"; 
  when "00011001" => data := X"D4"; 
  when "00011010" => data := X"A2"; 
  when "00011011" => data := X"AF"; 
  when "00011100" => data := X"9C"; 
  when "00011101" => data := X"A4"; 
  when "00011110" => data := X"72"; 
  when "00011111" => data := X"C0"; 
  when "00100000" => data := X"B7"; 
  when "00100001" => data := X"FD"; 
  when "00100010" => data := X"93"; 
  when "00100011" => data := X"26"; 
  when "00100100" => data := X"36"; 
  when "00100101" => data := X"3F"; 
  when "00100110" => data := X"F7"; 
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  when "00100111" => data := X"CC"; 
  when "00101000" => data := X"34"; 
  when "00101001" => data := X"A5"; 
  when "00101010" => data := X"E5"; 
  when "00101011" => data := X"F1"; 
  when "00101100" => data := X"71"; 
  when "00101101" => data := X"D8"; 
  when "00101110" => data := X"31"; 
  when "00101111" => data := X"15"; 
  when "00110000" => data := X"04"; 
  when "00110001" => data := X"C7"; 
  when "00110010" => data := X"23"; 
  when "00110011" => data := X"C3"; 
  when "00110100" => data := X"18"; 
  when "00110101" => data := X"96"; 
  when "00110110" => data := X"05"; 
  when "00110111" => data := X"9A"; 
  when "00111000" => data := X"07"; 
  when "00111001" => data := X"12"; 
  when "00111010" => data := X"80"; 
  when "00111011" => data := X"E2"; 
  when "00111100" => data := X"EB"; 
  when "00111101" => data := X"27"; 
  when "00111110" => data := X"B2"; 
  when "00111111" => data := X"75"; 
  when "01000000" => data := X"09"; 
  when "01000001" => data := X"83"; 
  when "01000010" => data := X"2C"; 
  when "01000011" => data := X"1A"; 
  when "01000100" => data := X"1B"; 
  when "01000101" => data := X"6E"; 
  when "01000110" => data := X"5A"; 
  when "01000111" => data := X"A0"; 
  when "01001000" => data := X"52"; 
  when "01001001" => data := X"3B"; 
  when "01001010" => data := X"D6"; 
  when "01001011" => data := X"B3"; 
  when "01001100" => data := X"29"; 
  when "01001101" => data := X"E3"; 
  when "01001110" => data := X"2F"; 
  when "01001111" => data := X"84"; 
  when "01010000" => data := X"53"; 
  when "01010001" => data := X"D1"; 
  when "01010010" => data := X"00"; 
  when "01010011" => data := X"ED"; 
  when "01010100" => data := X"20"; 
  when "01010101" => data := X"FC"; 
  when "01010110" => data := X"B1"; 
  when "01010111" => data := X"5B"; 
  when "01011000" => data := X"6A"; 
  when "01011001" => data := X"CB"; 
  when "01011010" => data := X"BE"; 
  when "01011011" => data := X"39"; 
  when "01011100" => data := X"4A"; 
  when "01011101" => data := X"4C"; 
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  when "01011110" => data := X"58"; 
  when "01011111" => data := X"CF"; 
  when "01100000" => data := X"D0"; 
  when "01100001" => data := X"EF"; 
  when "01100010" => data := X"AA"; 
  when "01100011" => data := X"FB"; 
  when "01100100" => data := X"43"; 
  when "01100101" => data := X"4D"; 
  when "01100110" => data := X"33"; 
  when "01100111" => data := X"85"; 
  when "01101000" => data := X"45"; 
  when "01101001" => data := X"F9"; 
  when "01101010" => data := X"02"; 
  when "01101011" => data := X"7F"; 
  when "01101100" => data := X"50"; 
  when "01101101" => data := X"3C"; 
  when "01101110" => data := X"9F"; 
  when "01101111" => data := X"A8"; 
  when "01110000" => data := X"51"; 
  when "01110001" => data := X"A3"; 
  when "01110010" => data := X"40"; 
  when "01110011" => data := X"8F"; 
  when "01110100" => data := X"92"; 
  when "01110101" => data := X"9D"; 
  when "01110110" => data := X"38"; 
  when "01110111" => data := X"F5"; 
  when "01111000" => data := X"BC"; 
  when "01111001" => data := X"B6"; 
  when "01111010" => data := X"DA"; 
  when "01111011" => data := X"21"; 
  when "01111100" => data := X"10"; 
  when "01111101" => data := X"FF"; 
  when "01111110" => data := X"F3"; 
  when "01111111" => data := X"D2"; 
  when "10000000" => data := X"CD"; 
  when "10000001" => data := X"0C"; 
  when "10000010" => data := X"13"; 
  when "10000011" => data := X"EC"; 
  when "10000100" => data := X"5F"; 
  when "10000101" => data := X"97"; 
  when "10000110" => data := X"44"; 
  when "10000111" => data := X"17"; 
  when "10001000" => data := X"C4"; 
  when "10001001" => data := X"A7"; 
  when "10001010" => data := X"7E"; 
  when "10001011" => data := X"3D"; 
  when "10001100" => data := X"64"; 
  when "10001101" => data := X"5D"; 
  when "10001110" => data := X"19"; 
  when "10001111" => data := X"73"; 
  when "10010000" => data := X"60"; 
  when "10010001" => data := X"81"; 
  when "10010010" => data := X"4F"; 
  when "10010011" => data := X"DC"; 
  when "10010100" => data := X"22"; 
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  when "10010101" => data := X"2A"; 
  when "10010110" => data := X"90"; 
  when "10010111" => data := X"88"; 
  when "10011000" => data := X"46"; 
  when "10011001" => data := X"EE"; 
  when "10011010" => data := X"B8"; 
  when "10011011" => data := X"14"; 
  when "10011100" => data := X"DE"; 
  when "10011101" => data := X"5E"; 
  when "10011110" => data := X"0B"; 
  when "10011111" => data := X"DB"; 
  when "10100000" => data := X"E0"; 
  when "10100001" => data := X"32"; 
  when "10100010" => data := X"3A"; 
  when "10100011" => data := X"0A"; 
  when "10100100" => data := X"49"; 
  when "10100101" => data := X"06"; 
  when "10100110" => data := X"24"; 
  when "10100111" => data := X"5C"; 
  when "10101000" => data := X"C2"; 
  when "10101001" => data := X"D3"; 
  when "10101010" => data := X"AC"; 
  when "10101011" => data := X"62"; 
  when "10101100" => data := X"91"; 
  when "10101101" => data := X"95"; 
  when "10101110" => data := X"E4"; 
  when "10101111" => data := X"79"; 
  when "10110000" => data := X"E7"; 
  when "10110001" => data := X"C8"; 
  when "10110010" => data := X"37"; 
  when "10110011" => data := X"6D"; 
  when "10110100" => data := X"8D"; 
  when "10110101" => data := X"D5"; 
  when "10110110" => data := X"4E"; 
  when "10110111" => data := X"A9"; 
  when "10111000" => data := X"6C"; 
  when "10111001" => data := X"56"; 
  when "10111010" => data := X"F4"; 
  when "10111011" => data := X"EA"; 
  when "10111100" => data := X"65"; 
  when "10111101" => data := X"7A"; 
  when "10111110" => data := X"AE"; 
  when "10111111" => data := X"08"; 
  when "11000000" => data := X"BA"; 
  when "11000001" => data := X"78"; 
  when "11000010" => data := X"25"; 
  when "11000011" => data := X"2E"; 
  when "11000100" => data := X"1C"; 
  when "11000101" => data := X"A6"; 
  when "11000110" => data := X"B4"; 
  when "11000111" => data := X"C6"; 
  when "11001000" => data := X"E8"; 
  when "11001001" => data := X"DD"; 
  when "11001010" => data := X"74"; 
  when "11001011" => data := X"1F"; 
99 
 
  when "11001100" => data := X"4B"; 
  when "11001101" => data := X"BD"; 
  when "11001110" => data := X"8B"; 
  when "11001111" => data := X"8A"; 
  when "11010000" => data := X"70"; 
  when "11010001" => data := X"3E"; 
  when "11010010" => data := X"B5"; 
  when "11010011" => data := X"66"; 
  when "11010100" => data := X"48"; 
  when "11010101" => data := X"03"; 
  when "11010110" => data := X"F6"; 
  when "11010111" => data := X"0E"; 
  when "11011000" => data := X"61"; 
  when "11011001" => data := X"35"; 
  when "11011010" => data := X"57"; 
  when "11011011" => data := X"B9"; 
  when "11011100" => data := X"86"; 
  when "11011101" => data := X"C1"; 
  when "11011110" => data := X"1D"; 
  when "11011111" => data := X"9E"; 
  when "11100000" => data := X"E1"; 
  when "11100001" => data := X"F8"; 
  when "11100010" => data := X"98"; 
  when "11100011" => data := X"11"; 
  when "11100100" => data := X"69"; 
  when "11100101" => data := X"D9"; 
  when "11100110" => data := X"8E"; 
  when "11100111" => data := X"94"; 
  when "11101000" => data := X"9B"; 
  when "11101001" => data := X"1E"; 
  when "11101010" => data := X"87"; 
  when "11101011" => data := X"E9"; 
  when "11101100" => data := X"CE"; 
  when "11101101" => data := X"55"; 
  when "11101110" => data := X"28"; 
  when "11101111" => data := X"DF"; 
  when "11110000" => data := X"8C"; 
  when "11110001" => data := X"A1"; 
  when "11110010" => data := X"89"; 
  when "11110011" => data := X"0D"; 
  when "11110100" => data := X"BF"; 
  when "11110101" => data := X"E6"; 
  when "11110110" => data := X"42"; 
  when "11110111" => data := X"68"; 
  when "11111000" => data := X"41"; 
  when "11111001" => data := X"99"; 
  when "11111010" => data := X"2D"; 
  when "11111011" => data := X"0F"; 
  when "11111100" => data := X"B0"; 
  when "11111101" => data := X"54"; 
  when "11111110" => data := X"BB"; 
  when "11111111" => data := X"16"; 
  when others => null;   
end case; 




end function sbox_val; 
 
--This function implements the inverse S-Box LUT 
function inv_sbox_val(address: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return 
std_logic_vector is 
variable inv_data: bit_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable inv_data_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
case address is 
 
  when "00000000" => inv_data := X"52"; 
  when "00000001" => inv_data := X"09"; 
  when "00000010" => inv_data := X"6a"; 
  when "00000011" => inv_data := X"d5"; 
  when "00000100" => inv_data := X"30"; 
  when "00000101" => inv_data := X"36"; 
  when "00000110" => inv_data := X"a5"; 
  when "00000111" => inv_data := X"38"; 
  when "00001000" => inv_data := X"bf"; 
  when "00001001" => inv_data := X"40"; 
  when "00001010" => inv_data := X"a3"; 
  when "00001011" => inv_data := X"9e"; 
  when "00001100" => inv_data := X"81"; 
  when "00001101" => inv_data := X"f3"; 
  when "00001110" => inv_data := X"d7"; 
  when "00001111" => inv_data := X"fb"; 
  when "00010000" => inv_data := X"7c"; 
  when "00010001" => inv_data := X"e3"; 
  when "00010010" => inv_data := X"39"; 
  when "00010011" => inv_data := X"82"; 
  when "00010100" => inv_data := X"9b"; 
  when "00010101" => inv_data := X"2f"; 
  when "00010110" => inv_data := X"ff"; 
  when "00010111" => inv_data := X"87"; 
  when "00011000" => inv_data := X"34"; 
  when "00011001" => inv_data := X"8e"; 
  when "00011010" => inv_data := X"43"; 
  when "00011011" => inv_data := X"44"; 
  when "00011100" => inv_data := X"c4"; 
  when "00011101" => inv_data := X"de"; 
  when "00011110" => inv_data := X"e9"; 
  when "00011111" => inv_data := X"cb"; 
  when "00100000" => inv_data := X"54"; 
  when "00100001" => inv_data := X"7b"; 
  when "00100010" => inv_data := X"94"; 
  when "00100011" => inv_data := X"32"; 
  when "00100100" => inv_data := X"a6"; 
  when "00100101" => inv_data := X"c2"; 
  when "00100110" => inv_data := X"23"; 
  when "00100111" => inv_data := X"3d"; 
  when "00101000" => inv_data := X"ee"; 
  when "00101001" => inv_data := X"4c"; 
  when "00101010" => inv_data := X"95"; 
  when "00101011" => inv_data := X"0b"; 
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  when "00101100" => inv_data := X"42"; 
  when "00101101" => inv_data := X"fa"; 
  when "00101110" => inv_data := X"c3"; 
  when "00101111" => inv_data := X"4e"; 
  when "00110000" => inv_data := X"08"; 
  when "00110001" => inv_data := X"2e"; 
  when "00110010" => inv_data := X"a1"; 
  when "00110011" => inv_data := X"66"; 
  when "00110100" => inv_data := X"28"; 
  when "00110101" => inv_data := X"d9"; 
  when "00110110" => inv_data := X"24"; 
  when "00110111" => inv_data := X"b2"; 
  when "00111000" => inv_data := X"76"; 
  when "00111001" => inv_data := X"5b"; 
  when "00111010" => inv_data := X"a2"; 
  when "00111011" => inv_data := X"49"; 
  when "00111100" => inv_data := X"6d"; 
  when "00111101" => inv_data := X"8b"; 
  when "00111110" => inv_data := X"d1"; 
  when "00111111" => inv_data := X"25"; 
  when "01000000" => inv_data := X"72"; 
  when "01000001" => inv_data := X"f8"; 
  when "01000010" => inv_data := X"f6"; 
  when "01000011" => inv_data := X"64"; 
  when "01000100" => inv_data := X"86"; 
  when "01000101" => inv_data := X"68"; 
  when "01000110" => inv_data := X"98"; 
  when "01000111" => inv_data := X"16"; 
  when "01001000" => inv_data := X"d4"; 
  when "01001001" => inv_data := X"a4"; 
  when "01001010" => inv_data := X"5c"; 
  when "01001011" => inv_data := X"cc"; 
  when "01001100" => inv_data := X"5d"; 
  when "01001101" => inv_data := X"65"; 
  when "01001110" => inv_data := X"b6"; 
  when "01001111" => inv_data := X"92"; 
  when "01010000" => inv_data := X"6c"; 
  when "01010001" => inv_data := X"70"; 
  when "01010010" => inv_data := X"48"; 
  when "01010011" => inv_data := X"50"; 
  when "01010100" => inv_data := X"fd"; 
  when "01010101" => inv_data := X"ed"; 
  when "01010110" => inv_data := X"b9"; 
  when "01010111" => inv_data := X"da"; 
  when "01011000" => inv_data := X"5e"; 
  when "01011001" => inv_data := X"15"; 
  when "01011010" => inv_data := X"46"; 
  when "01011011" => inv_data := X"57"; 
  when "01011100" => inv_data := X"a7"; 
  when "01011101" => inv_data := X"8d"; 
  when "01011110" => inv_data := X"9d"; 
  when "01011111" => inv_data := X"84"; 
  when "01100000" => inv_data := X"90"; 
  when "01100001" => inv_data := X"d8"; 
  when "01100010" => inv_data := X"ab"; 
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  when "01100011" => inv_data := X"00"; 
  when "01100100" => inv_data := X"8c"; 
  when "01100101" => inv_data := X"bc"; 
  when "01100110" => inv_data := X"d3"; 
  when "01100111" => inv_data := X"0a"; 
  when "01101000" => inv_data := X"f7"; 
  when "01101001" => inv_data := X"e4"; 
  when "01101010" => inv_data := X"58"; 
  when "01101011" => inv_data := X"05"; 
  when "01101100" => inv_data := X"b8"; 
  when "01101101" => inv_data := X"b3"; 
  when "01101110" => inv_data := X"45"; 
  when "01101111" => inv_data := X"06"; 
  when "01110000" => inv_data := X"d0"; 
  when "01110001" => inv_data := X"2c"; 
  when "01110010" => inv_data := X"1e"; 
  when "01110011" => inv_data := X"8f"; 
  when "01110100" => inv_data := X"ca"; 
  when "01110101" => inv_data := X"3f"; 
  when "01110110" => inv_data := X"0f"; 
  when "01110111" => inv_data := X"02"; 
  when "01111000" => inv_data := X"c1"; 
  when "01111001" => inv_data := X"af"; 
  when "01111010" => inv_data := X"bd"; 
  when "01111011" => inv_data := X"03"; 
  when "01111100" => inv_data := X"01"; 
  when "01111101" => inv_data := X"13"; 
  when "01111110" => inv_data := X"8a"; 
  when "01111111" => inv_data := X"6b"; 
  when "10000000" => inv_data := X"3a"; 
  when "10000001" => inv_data := X"91"; 
  when "10000010" => inv_data := X"11"; 
  when "10000011" => inv_data := X"41"; 
  when "10000100" => inv_data := X"4f"; 
  when "10000101" => inv_data := X"67"; 
  when "10000110" => inv_data := X"dc"; 
  when "10000111" => inv_data := X"ea"; 
  when "10001000" => inv_data := X"97"; 
  when "10001001" => inv_data := X"f2"; 
  when "10001010" => inv_data := X"cf"; 
  when "10001011" => inv_data := X"ce"; 
  when "10001100" => inv_data := X"f0"; 
  when "10001101" => inv_data := X"b4"; 
  when "10001110" => inv_data := X"e6"; 
  when "10001111" => inv_data := X"73"; 
  when "10010000" => inv_data := X"96"; 
  when "10010001" => inv_data := X"ac"; 
  when "10010010" => inv_data := X"74"; 
  when "10010011" => inv_data := X"22"; 
  when "10010100" => inv_data := X"e7"; 
  when "10010101" => inv_data := X"ad"; 
  when "10010110" => inv_data := X"35"; 
  when "10010111" => inv_data := X"85"; 
  when "10011000" => inv_data := X"e2"; 
  when "10011001" => inv_data := X"f9"; 
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  when "10011010" => inv_data := X"37"; 
  when "10011011" => inv_data := X"e8"; 
  when "10011100" => inv_data := X"1c"; 
  when "10011101" => inv_data := X"75"; 
  when "10011110" => inv_data := X"df"; 
  when "10011111" => inv_data := X"6e"; 
  when "10100000" => inv_data := X"47"; 
  when "10100001" => inv_data := X"f1"; 
  when "10100010" => inv_data := X"1a"; 
  when "10100011" => inv_data := X"71"; 
  when "10100100" => inv_data := X"1d"; 
  when "10100101" => inv_data := X"29"; 
  when "10100110" => inv_data := X"c5"; 
  when "10100111" => inv_data := X"89"; 
  when "10101000" => inv_data := X"6f"; 
  when "10101001" => inv_data := X"b7"; 
  when "10101010" => inv_data := X"62"; 
  when "10101011" => inv_data := X"0e"; 
  when "10101100" => inv_data := X"aa"; 
  when "10101101" => inv_data := X"18"; 
  when "10101110" => inv_data := X"be"; 
  when "10101111" => inv_data := X"1b"; 
  when "10110000" => inv_data := X"fc"; 
  when "10110001" => inv_data := X"56"; 
  when "10110010" => inv_data := X"3e"; 
  when "10110011" => inv_data := X"4b"; 
  when "10110100" => inv_data := X"c6"; 
  when "10110101" => inv_data := X"d2"; 
  when "10110110" => inv_data := X"79"; 
  when "10110111" => inv_data := X"20"; 
  when "10111000" => inv_data := X"9a"; 
  when "10111001" => inv_data := X"db"; 
  when "10111010" => inv_data := X"c0"; 
  when "10111011" => inv_data := X"fe"; 
  when "10111100" => inv_data := X"78"; 
  when "10111101" => inv_data := X"cd"; 
  when "10111110" => inv_data := X"5a"; 
  when "10111111" => inv_data := X"f4"; 
  when "11000000" => inv_data := X"1f"; 
  when "11000001" => inv_data := X"dd"; 
  when "11000010" => inv_data := X"a8"; 
  when "11000011" => inv_data := X"33"; 
  when "11000100" => inv_data := X"88"; 
  when "11000101" => inv_data := X"07"; 
  when "11000110" => inv_data := X"c7"; 
  when "11000111" => inv_data := X"31"; 
  when "11001000" => inv_data := X"b1"; 
  when "11001001" => inv_data := X"12"; 
  when "11001010" => inv_data := X"10"; 
  when "11001011" => inv_data := X"59"; 
  when "11001100" => inv_data := X"27"; 
  when "11001101" => inv_data := X"80"; 
  when "11001110" => inv_data := X"ec"; 
  when "11001111" => inv_data := X"5f"; 
  when "11010000" => inv_data := X"60"; 
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  when "11010001" => inv_data := X"51"; 
  when "11010010" => inv_data := X"7f"; 
  when "11010011" => inv_data := X"a9"; 
  when "11010100" => inv_data := X"19"; 
  when "11010101" => inv_data := X"b5"; 
  when "11010110" => inv_data := X"4a"; 
  when "11010111" => inv_data := X"0d"; 
  when "11011000" => inv_data := X"2d"; 
  when "11011001" => inv_data := X"e5"; 
  when "11011010" => inv_data := X"7a"; 
  when "11011011" => inv_data := X"9f"; 
  when "11011100" => inv_data := X"93"; 
  when "11011101" => inv_data := X"c9"; 
  when "11011110" => inv_data := X"9c"; 
  when "11011111" => inv_data := X"ef"; 
  when "11100000" => inv_data := X"a0"; 
  when "11100001" => inv_data := X"e0"; 
  when "11100010" => inv_data := X"3b"; 
  when "11100011" => inv_data := X"4d"; 
  when "11100100" => inv_data := X"ae"; 
  when "11100101" => inv_data := X"2a"; 
  when "11100110" => inv_data := X"f5"; 
  when "11100111" => inv_data := X"b0"; 
  when "11101000" => inv_data := X"c8"; 
  when "11101001" => inv_data := X"eb"; 
  when "11101010" => inv_data := X"bb"; 
  when "11101011" => inv_data := X"3c"; 
  when "11101100" => inv_data := X"83"; 
  when "11101101" => inv_data := X"53"; 
  when "11101110" => inv_data := X"99"; 
  when "11101111" => inv_data := X"61"; 
  when "11110000" => inv_data := X"17"; 
  when "11110001" => inv_data := X"2b"; 
  when "11110010" => inv_data := X"04"; 
  when "11110011" => inv_data := X"7e"; 
  when "11110100" => inv_data := X"ba"; 
  when "11110101" => inv_data := X"77"; 
  when "11110110" => inv_data := X"d6"; 
  when "11110111" => inv_data := X"26"; 
  when "11111000" => inv_data := X"e1"; 
  when "11111001" => inv_data := X"69"; 
  when "11111010" => inv_data := X"14"; 
  when "11111011" => inv_data := X"63"; 
  when "11111100" => inv_data := X"55"; 
  when "11111101" => inv_data := X"21"; 
  when "11111110" => inv_data := X"0c"; 
  when "11111111" => inv_data := X"7d"; 
  when others => null;   
end case; 
inv_data_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(inv_data); 
return inv_data_stdlogic; 




SubBytes Extended Field Inversion 
function sbox_val(inp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); mode: std_logic) 
return std_logic_vector is 
variable address: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable data: bit_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable data_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable outdata: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
 
--Performs affine transform first if in Decrypt mode  
if mode='0' then 
  address(7) := inp(6) xor inp(4) xor inp(1) xor '0';   
  address(6) := inp(5) xor inp(3) xor inp(0) xor '0';   
  address(5) := inp(7) xor inp(4) xor inp(2) xor '0';   
  address(4) := inp(6) xor inp(3) xor inp(1) xor '0';   
  address(3) := inp(5) xor inp(2) xor inp(0) xor '0';   
  address(2) := inp(7) xor inp(4) xor inp(1) xor '1';   
  address(1) := inp(6) xor inp(3) xor inp(0) xor '0';   
  address(0) := inp(7) xor inp(5) xor inp(2) xor '1'; 
else 
  address := inp; 
end if; 
 
--Modular inversion in the extended field LUT 
case address is 
 
  when "00000000" => data := "00000000"; 
  when "00000001" => data := "00000001"; 
  when "00000010" => data := "10001101"; 
  when "00000011" => data := "11110110"; 
  when "00000100" => data := "11001011"; 
  when "00000101" => data := "01010010"; 
  when "00000110" => data := "01111011"; 
  when "00000111" => data := "11010001"; 
  when "00001000" => data := "11101000"; 
  when "00001001" => data := "01001111"; 
  when "00001010" => data := "00101001"; 
  when "00001011" => data := "11000000"; 
  when "00001100" => data := "10110000"; 
  when "00001101" => data := "11100001"; 
  when "00001110" => data := "11100101"; 
  when "00001111" => data := "11000111"; 
  when "00010000" => data := "01110100"; 
  when "00010001" => data := "10110100"; 
  when "00010010" => data := "10101010"; 
  when "00010011" => data := "01001011"; 
  when "00010100" => data := "10011001"; 
  when "00010101" => data := "00101011"; 
  when "00010110" => data := "01100000"; 
  when "00010111" => data := "01011111"; 
  when "00011000" => data := "01011000"; 
  when "00011001" => data := "00111111"; 
  when "00011010" => data := "11111101"; 
  when "00011011" => data := "11001100"; 
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  when "00011100" => data := "11111111"; 
  when "00011101" => data := "01000000"; 
  when "00011110" => data := "11101110"; 
  when "00011111" => data := "10110010"; 
  when "00100000" => data := "00111010"; 
  when "00100001" => data := "01101110"; 
  when "00100010" => data := "01011010"; 
  when "00100011" => data := "11110001"; 
  when "00100100" => data := "01010101"; 
  when "00100101" => data := "01001101"; 
  when "00100110" => data := "10101000"; 
  when "00100111" => data := "11001001"; 
  when "00101000" => data := "11000001"; 
  when "00101001" => data := "00001010"; 
  when "00101010" => data := "10011000"; 
  when "00101011" => data := "00010101"; 
  when "00101100" => data := "00110000"; 
  when "00101101" => data := "01000100"; 
  when "00101110" => data := "10100010"; 
  when "00101111" => data := "11000010"; 
  when "00110000" => data := "00101100"; 
  when "00110001" => data := "01000101"; 
  when "00110010" => data := "10010010"; 
  when "00110011" => data := "01101100"; 
  when "00110100" => data := "11110011"; 
  when "00110101" => data := "00111001"; 
  when "00110110" => data := "01100110"; 
  when "00110111" => data := "01000010"; 
  when "00111000" => data := "11110010"; 
  when "00111001" => data := "00110101"; 
  when "00111010" => data := "00100000"; 
  when "00111011" => data := "01101111"; 
  when "00111100" => data := "01110111"; 
  when "00111101" => data := "10111011"; 
  when "00111110" => data := "01011001"; 
  when "00111111" => data := "00011001"; 
  when "01000000" => data := "00011101"; 
  when "01000001" => data := "11111110"; 
  when "01000010" => data := "00110111"; 
  when "01000011" => data := "01100111"; 
  when "01000100" => data := "00101101"; 
  when "01000101" => data := "00110001"; 
  when "01000110" => data := "11110101"; 
  when "01000111" => data := "01101001"; 
  when "01001000" => data := "10100111"; 
  when "01001001" => data := "01100100"; 
  when "01001010" => data := "10101011"; 
  when "01001011" => data := "00010011"; 
  when "01001100" => data := "01010100"; 
  when "01001101" => data := "00100101"; 
  when "01001110" => data := "11101001"; 
  when "01001111" => data := "00001001"; 
  when "01010000" => data := "11101101"; 
  when "01010001" => data := "01011100"; 
  when "01010010" => data := "00000101"; 
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  when "01010011" => data := "11001010"; 
  when "01010100" => data := "01001100"; 
  when "01010101" => data := "00100100"; 
  when "01010110" => data := "10000111"; 
  when "01010111" => data := "10111111"; 
  when "01011000" => data := "00011000"; 
  when "01011001" => data := "00111110"; 
  when "01011010" => data := "00100010"; 
  when "01011011" => data := "11110000"; 
  when "01011100" => data := "01010001"; 
  when "01011101" => data := "11101100"; 
  when "01011110" => data := "01100001"; 
  when "01011111" => data := "00010111"; 
  when "01100000" => data := "00010110"; 
  when "01100001" => data := "01011110"; 
  when "01100010" => data := "10101111"; 
  when "01100011" => data := "11010011"; 
  when "01100100" => data := "01001001"; 
  when "01100101" => data := "10100110"; 
  when "01100110" => data := "00110110"; 
  when "01100111" => data := "01000011"; 
  when "01101000" => data := "11110100"; 
  when "01101001" => data := "01000111"; 
  when "01101010" => data := "10010001"; 
  when "01101011" => data := "11011111"; 
  when "01101100" => data := "00110011"; 
  when "01101101" => data := "10010011"; 
  when "01101110" => data := "00100001"; 
  when "01101111" => data := "00111011"; 
  when "01110000" => data := "01111001"; 
  when "01110001" => data := "10110111"; 
  when "01110010" => data := "10010111"; 
  when "01110011" => data := "10000101"; 
  when "01110100" => data := "00010000"; 
  when "01110101" => data := "10110101"; 
  when "01110110" => data := "10111010"; 
  when "01110111" => data := "00111100"; 
  when "01111000" => data := "10110110"; 
  when "01111001" => data := "01110000"; 
  when "01111010" => data := "11010000"; 
  when "01111011" => data := "00000110"; 
  when "01111100" => data := "10100001"; 
  when "01111101" => data := "11111010"; 
  when "01111110" => data := "10000001"; 
  when "01111111" => data := "10000010"; 
  when "10000000" => data := "10000011"; 
  when "10000001" => data := "01111110"; 
  when "10000010" => data := "01111111"; 
  when "10000011" => data := "10000000"; 
  when "10000100" => data := "10010110"; 
  when "10000101" => data := "01110011"; 
  when "10000110" => data := "10111110"; 
  when "10000111" => data := "01010110"; 
  when "10001000" => data := "10011011"; 
  when "10001001" => data := "10011110"; 
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  when "10001010" => data := "10010101"; 
  when "10001011" => data := "11011001"; 
  when "10001100" => data := "11110111"; 
  when "10001101" => data := "00000010"; 
  when "10001110" => data := "10111001"; 
  when "10001111" => data := "10100100"; 
  when "10010000" => data := "11011110"; 
  when "10010001" => data := "01101010"; 
  when "10010010" => data := "00110010"; 
  when "10010011" => data := "01101101"; 
  when "10010100" => data := "11011000"; 
  when "10010101" => data := "10001010"; 
  when "10010110" => data := "10000100"; 
  when "10010111" => data := "01110010"; 
  when "10011000" => data := "00101010"; 
  when "10011001" => data := "00010100"; 
  when "10011010" => data := "10011111"; 
  when "10011011" => data := "10001000"; 
  when "10011100" => data := "11111001"; 
  when "10011101" => data := "11011100"; 
  when "10011110" => data := "10001001"; 
  when "10011111" => data := "10011010"; 
  when "10100000" => data := "11111011"; 
  when "10100001" => data := "01111100"; 
  when "10100010" => data := "00101110"; 
  when "10100011" => data := "11000011"; 
  when "10100100" => data := "10001111"; 
  when "10100101" => data := "10111000"; 
  when "10100110" => data := "01100101"; 
  when "10100111" => data := "01001000"; 
  when "10101000" => data := "00100110"; 
  when "10101001" => data := "11001000"; 
  when "10101010" => data := "00010010"; 
  when "10101011" => data := "01001010"; 
  when "10101100" => data := "11001110"; 
  when "10101101" => data := "11100111"; 
  when "10101110" => data := "11010010"; 
  when "10101111" => data := "01100010"; 
  when "10110000" => data := "00001100"; 
  when "10110001" => data := "11100000"; 
  when "10110010" => data := "00011111"; 
  when "10110011" => data := "11101111"; 
  when "10110100" => data := "00010001"; 
  when "10110101" => data := "01110101"; 
  when "10110110" => data := "01111000"; 
  when "10110111" => data := "01110001"; 
  when "10111000" => data := "10100101"; 
  when "10111001" => data := "10001110"; 
  when "10111010" => data := "01110110"; 
  when "10111011" => data := "00111101"; 
  when "10111100" => data := "10111101"; 
  when "10111101" => data := "10111100"; 
  when "10111110" => data := "10000110"; 
  when "10111111" => data := "01010111"; 
  when "11000000" => data := "00001011"; 
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  when "11000001" => data := "00101000"; 
  when "11000010" => data := "00101111"; 
  when "11000011" => data := "10100011"; 
  when "11000100" => data := "11011010"; 
  when "11000101" => data := "11010100"; 
  when "11000110" => data := "11100100"; 
  when "11000111" => data := "00001111"; 
  when "11001000" => data := "10101001"; 
  when "11001001" => data := "00100111"; 
  when "11001010" => data := "01010011"; 
  when "11001011" => data := "00000100"; 
  when "11001100" => data := "00011011"; 
  when "11001101" => data := "11111100"; 
  when "11001110" => data := "10101100"; 
  when "11001111" => data := "11100110"; 
  when "11010000" => data := "01111010"; 
  when "11010001" => data := "00000111"; 
  when "11010010" => data := "10101110"; 
  when "11010011" => data := "01100011"; 
  when "11010100" => data := "11000101"; 
  when "11010101" => data := "11011011"; 
  when "11010110" => data := "11100010"; 
  when "11010111" => data := "11101010"; 
  when "11011000" => data := "10010100"; 
  when "11011001" => data := "10001011"; 
  when "11011010" => data := "11000100"; 
  when "11011011" => data := "11010101"; 
  when "11011100" => data := "10011101"; 
  when "11011101" => data := "11111000"; 
  when "11011110" => data := "10010000"; 
  when "11011111" => data := "01101011"; 
  when "11100000" => data := "10110001"; 
  when "11100001" => data := "00001101"; 
  when "11100010" => data := "11010110"; 
  when "11100011" => data := "11101011"; 
  when "11100100" => data := "11000110"; 
  when "11100101" => data := "00001110"; 
  when "11100110" => data := "11001111"; 
  when "11100111" => data := "10101101"; 
  when "11101000" => data := "00001000"; 
  when "11101001" => data := "01001110"; 
  when "11101010" => data := "11010111"; 
  when "11101011" => data := "11100011"; 
  when "11101100" => data := "01011101"; 
  when "11101101" => data := "01010000"; 
  when "11101110" => data := "00011110"; 
  when "11101111" => data := "10110011"; 
  when "11110000" => data := "01011011"; 
  when "11110001" => data := "00100011"; 
  when "11110010" => data := "00111000"; 
  when "11110011" => data := "00110100"; 
  when "11110100" => data := "01101000"; 
  when "11110101" => data := "01000110"; 
  when "11110110" => data := "00000011"; 
  when "11110111" => data := "10001100"; 
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  when "11111000" => data := "11011101"; 
  when "11111001" => data := "10011100"; 
  when "11111010" => data := "01111101"; 
  when "11111011" => data := "10100000"; 
  when "11111100" => data := "11001101"; 
  when "11111101" => data := "00011010"; 
  when "11111110" => data := "01000001"; 
  when "11111111" => data := "00011100"; 
  when others => null;   
end case; 
data_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(data); 
 
--Performs the affine transform after inversion if in Encrypt mode  
if mode='1' then 
  outdata(7) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor 
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor '0';   
  outdata(6) := data_stdlogic(6) xor data_stdlogic(5) xor 
data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor data_stdlogic(2) xor '1';   
  outdata(5) := data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor 
data_stdlogic(3) xor data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor '1';   
  outdata(4) := data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor 
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';   
  outdata(3) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor 
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';   
  outdata(2) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor 
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';   
  outdata(1) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor 
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '1';   
  outdata(0) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor 
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '1';  
else 
    outdata := data_stdlogic; 
end if; 
return outdata; 











SubBytes Composite Field Inversion 
--Function performs multiplication in the subfield 
function mult(  
     inmult1: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);  
     inmult2: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0) 
     ) 
return std_logic_vector is 
 
variable outmult: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable a: std_logic; 
variable b: std_logic; 
variable c: std_logic; 
begin 
 
a := inmult1(3) xor inmult1(0); 
b := inmult1(1) xor inmult1(0); 
c := inmult1(2) xor inmult1(1); 
 
outmult(3) := (inmult2(3) and inmult1(3)) xor (inmult2(2) and 
inmult1(0)) xor (inmult2(1) and inmult1(1)) xor (inmult2(0) and 
inmult1(2)); 
outmult(2) := (inmult2(3) and inmult1(2)) xor (inmult2(2) and a) xor 
(inmult2(1) and b) xor (inmult2(0) and c); 
outmult(1) := (inmult2(3) and inmult1(1)) xor (inmult2(2) and 
inmult1(2)) xor (inmult2(1) and a) xor (inmult2(0) and b); 
outmult(0) := (inmult2(3) and inmult1(0)) xor (inmult2(2) and 
inmult1(1)) xor (inmult2(1) and inmult1(2)) xor (inmult2(0) and a); 
 
return outmult; 
end function mult; 
 
--Function squares in the subfield 
function squarer(in_sq: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0)) return 
std_logic_vector is 
variable out_sq: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
begin 
 
out_sq(3) := in_sq(3) xor in_sq(1); 
out_sq(2) := in_sq(1); 
out_sq(1) := in_sq(2) xor in_sq(0); 
out_sq(0) := in_sq(0); 
 
return out_sq; 
end function squarer; 
 
 
--Function inverts polynomials in the subfield 
function inv_val(input: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return 
std_logic_vector is 
variable z1: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable input2: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable z0: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable z1_squared: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable z0_squared: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
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variable z1z0: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable bz1 : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable F: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable Finv: bit_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable Finv_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable D1: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable D0: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable z1xorz0: std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); 
variable final : std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 




--Converts to “big endian” notation 
input2(7) := input(0); 
input2(6) := input(1); 
input2(5) := input(2); 
input2(4) := input(3); 
input2(3) := input(4); 
input2(2) := input(5); 
input2(1) := input(6); 
input2(0) := input(7); 
 
--Computes Z values 
z1(3) := input2(6) xor input2(2) xor input2(0); 
z1(2) := input2(5) xor input2(4); 
z1(1) := input2(6) xor input2(3) xor input2(1) xor input2(0); 
z1(0) := input2(2) xor input2(0); 
z0(3) := input2(7) xor input2(4) xor input2(3) xor input2(1) xor 
input2(0); 
z0(2) := input2(5) xor input2(1); 
z0(1) := input2(6) xor input2(5) xor input2(2) xor input2(0); 
z0(0) := input2(6) xor input2(5) xor input2(3) xor input2(2) xor 
input2(0); 
 
z1_squared := squarer(z1); 
z0_squared := squarer(z0); 
z1z0 := mult(z1,z0); 
bz1 := mult(b14,z1_squared); 
 
F(3) := z0_squared(3) xor z1z0(3) xor bz1(3); 
F(2) := z0_squared(2) xor z1z0(2) xor bz1(2); 
F(1) := z0_squared(1) xor z1z0(1) xor bz1(1); 
F(0) := z0_squared(0) xor z1z0(0) xor bz1(0); 
 
--Composite field inversion LUT 
case F is 
 
 when "0000" => Finv := "0000"; 
 when "0001" => Finv := "1111"; 
 when "0010" => Finv := "1011"; 
 when "0011" => Finv := "0101"; 
 when "0100" => Finv := "1001"; 
 when "0101" => Finv := "0011"; 
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 when "0110" => Finv := "1110"; 
 when "0111" => Finv := "1100"; 
 when "1000" => Finv := "1000"; 
 when "1001" => Finv := "0100"; 
 when "1010" => Finv := "1101"; 
 when "1011" => Finv := "0010"; 
 when "1100" => Finv := "0111"; 
 when "1101" => Finv := "1010"; 
 when "1110" => Finv := "0110"; 
 when "1111" => Finv := "0001"; 
 when others => null;   
end case; 
Finv_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(Finv); 
 
D1 := mult(z1, Finv_stdlogic); 
 
z1xorz0(3) := z1(3) xor z0(3); 
z1xorz0(2) := z1(2) xor z0(2); 
z1xorz0(1) := z1(1) xor z0(1); 
z1xorz0(0) := z1(0) xor z0(0); 
 
D0 := mult(z1xorz0, Finv_stdlogic); 
 
--[D1(3) D1(2) D1(1) D1(0) D0(3) D0(2) D0(1) D0(0) 
 
final(0) := D1(2) xor D1(1) xor D1(0) xor D0(3) xor D0(1); 
final(1) := D1(3) xor D1(0); 
final(2) := D1(3) xor D0(1); 
final(3) := D1(3) xor D1(2) xor D0(1); 
final(4) := D0(1) xor D0(0); 
final(5) := D1(1) xor D0(2) xor D0(0); 
final(6) := D1(3) xor D0(2) xor D0(1); 
final(7) := D1(1) xor D1(0) xor D0(2) xor D0(0); 
 
return final; 
end function inv_val; 
 
--Function performs affine transforms depending on Encrypt/Decrypt mode 
function sbox_val(inp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); mode: std_logic) 
return std_logic_vector is 
variable address: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable data_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable outdata: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
 
if mode='0' then 
  address(7) := inp(6) xor inp(4) xor inp(1) xor '0';   
  address(6) := inp(5) xor inp(3) xor inp(0) xor '0';   
  address(5) := inp(7) xor inp(4) xor inp(2) xor '0';   
  address(4) := inp(6) xor inp(3) xor inp(1) xor '0';   
  address(3) := inp(5) xor inp(2) xor inp(0) xor '0';   
  address(2) := inp(7) xor inp(4) xor inp(1) xor '1';   
  address(1) := inp(6) xor inp(3) xor inp(0) xor '0';   




  address := inp; 
end if; 
 
data_stdlogic := inv_val(address); 
 
if mode='1' then 
  outdata(7) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor 
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor '0';   
  outdata(6) := data_stdlogic(6) xor data_stdlogic(5) xor 
data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor data_stdlogic(2) xor '1';   
  outdata(5) := data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor 
data_stdlogic(3) xor data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor '1';   
  outdata(4) := data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor 
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';   
  outdata(3) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(3) xor 
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';   
  outdata(2) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor 
data_stdlogic(2) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '0';   
  outdata(1) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor 
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(1) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '1';   
  outdata(0) := data_stdlogic(7) xor data_stdlogic(6) xor 
data_stdlogic(5) xor data_stdlogic(4) xor data_stdlogic(0) xor '1';  
else 
    outdata := data_stdlogic; 
end if; 
return outdata; 















MixColumns Full LUT 
--xtime LUT 
function xtimes(inp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return 
std_logic_vector is 
variable table: bit_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable table_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
case inp is 
 
 when X"00" => table := X"00"; 
 when X"01" => table := X"02"; 
 when X"02" => table := X"04"; 
 when X"03" => table := X"06"; 
 when X"04" => table := X"08"; 
 when X"05" => table := X"0a"; 
 when X"06" => table := X"0c"; 
 when X"07" => table := X"0e"; 
 when X"08" => table := X"10"; 
 when X"09" => table := X"12"; 
 when X"0a" => table := X"14"; 
 when X"0b" => table := X"16"; 
 when X"0c" => table := X"18"; 
 when X"0d" => table := X"1a"; 
 when X"0e" => table := X"1c"; 
 when X"0f" => table := X"1e"; 
 when X"10" => table := X"20"; 
 when X"11" => table := X"22"; 
 when X"12" => table := X"24"; 
 when X"13" => table := X"26"; 
 when X"14" => table := X"28"; 
 when X"15" => table := X"2a"; 
 when X"16" => table := X"2c"; 
 when X"17" => table := X"2e"; 
 when X"18" => table := X"30"; 
 when X"19" => table := X"32"; 
 when X"1a" => table := X"34"; 
 when X"1b" => table := X"36"; 
 when X"1c" => table := X"38"; 
 when X"1d" => table := X"3a"; 
 when X"1e" => table := X"3c"; 
 when X"1f" => table := X"3e"; 
 when X"20" => table := X"40"; 
 when X"21" => table := X"42"; 
 when X"22" => table := X"44"; 
 when X"23" => table := X"46"; 
 when X"24" => table := X"48"; 
 when X"25" => table := X"4a"; 
 when X"26" => table := X"4c"; 
 when X"27" => table := X"4e"; 
 when X"28" => table := X"50"; 
 when X"29" => table := X"52"; 
 when X"2a" => table := X"54"; 
 when X"2b" => table := X"56"; 
 when X"2c" => table := X"58"; 
116 
 
 when X"2d" => table := X"5a"; 
 when X"2e" => table := X"5c"; 
 when X"2f" => table := X"5e"; 
 when X"30" => table := X"60"; 
 when X"31" => table := X"62"; 
 when X"32" => table := X"64"; 
 when X"33" => table := X"66"; 
 when X"34" => table := X"68"; 
 when X"35" => table := X"6a"; 
 when X"36" => table := X"6c"; 
 when X"37" => table := X"6e"; 
 when X"38" => table := X"70"; 
 when X"39" => table := X"72"; 
 when X"3a" => table := X"74"; 
 when X"3b" => table := X"76"; 
 when X"3c" => table := X"78"; 
 when X"3d" => table := X"7a"; 
 when X"3e" => table := X"7c"; 
 when X"3f" => table := X"7e"; 
 when X"40" => table := X"80"; 
 when X"41" => table := X"82"; 
 when X"42" => table := X"84"; 
 when X"43" => table := X"86"; 
 when X"44" => table := X"88"; 
 when X"45" => table := X"8a"; 
 when X"46" => table := X"8c"; 
 when X"47" => table := X"8e"; 
 when X"48" => table := X"90"; 
 when X"49" => table := X"92"; 
 when X"4a" => table := X"94"; 
 when X"4b" => table := X"96"; 
 when X"4c" => table := X"98"; 
 when X"4d" => table := X"9a"; 
 when X"4e" => table := X"9c"; 
 when X"4f" => table := X"9e"; 
 when X"50" => table := X"a0"; 
 when X"51" => table := X"a2"; 
 when X"52" => table := X"a4"; 
 when X"53" => table := X"a6"; 
 when X"54" => table := X"a8"; 
 when X"55" => table := X"aa"; 
 when X"56" => table := X"ac"; 
 when X"57" => table := X"ae"; 
 when X"58" => table := X"b0"; 
 when X"59" => table := X"b2"; 
 when X"5a" => table := X"b4"; 
 when X"5b" => table := X"b6"; 
 when X"5c" => table := X"b8"; 
 when X"5d" => table := X"ba"; 
 when X"5e" => table := X"bc"; 
 when X"5f" => table := X"be"; 
 when X"60" => table := X"c0"; 
 when X"61" => table := X"c2"; 
 when X"62" => table := X"c4"; 
 when X"63" => table := X"c6"; 
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 when X"64" => table := X"c8"; 
 when X"65" => table := X"ca"; 
 when X"66" => table := X"cc"; 
 when X"67" => table := X"ce"; 
 when X"68" => table := X"d0"; 
 when X"69" => table := X"d2"; 
 when X"6a" => table := X"d4"; 
 when X"6b" => table := X"d6"; 
 when X"6c" => table := X"d8"; 
 when X"6d" => table := X"da"; 
 when X"6e" => table := X"dc"; 
 when X"6f" => table := X"de"; 
 when X"70" => table := X"e0"; 
 when X"71" => table := X"e2"; 
 when X"72" => table := X"e4"; 
 when X"73" => table := X"e6"; 
 when X"74" => table := X"e8"; 
 when X"75" => table := X"ea"; 
 when X"76" => table := X"ec"; 
 when X"77" => table := X"ee"; 
 when X"78" => table := X"f0"; 
 when X"79" => table := X"f2"; 
 when X"7a" => table := X"f4"; 
 when X"7b" => table := X"f6"; 
 when X"7c" => table := X"f8"; 
 when X"7d" => table := X"fa"; 
 when X"7e" => table := X"fc"; 
 when X"7f" => table := X"fe"; 
 when X"80" => table := X"1b"; 
 when X"81" => table := X"19"; 
 when X"82" => table := X"1f"; 
 when X"83" => table := X"1d"; 
 when X"84" => table := X"13"; 
 when X"85" => table := X"11"; 
 when X"86" => table := X"17"; 
 when X"87" => table := X"15"; 
 when X"88" => table := X"0b"; 
 when X"89" => table := X"09"; 
 when X"8a" => table := X"0f"; 
 when X"8b" => table := X"0d"; 
 when X"8c" => table := X"03"; 
 when X"8d" => table := X"01"; 
 when X"8e" => table := X"07"; 
 when X"8f" => table := X"05"; 
 when X"90" => table := X"3b"; 
 when X"91" => table := X"39"; 
 when X"92" => table := X"3f"; 
 when X"93" => table := X"3d"; 
 when X"94" => table := X"33"; 
 when X"95" => table := X"31"; 
 when X"96" => table := X"37"; 
 when X"97" => table := X"35"; 
 when X"98" => table := X"2b"; 
 when X"99" => table := X"29"; 
 when X"9a" => table := X"2f"; 
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 when X"9b" => table := X"2d"; 
 when X"9c" => table := X"23"; 
 when X"9d" => table := X"21"; 
 when X"9e" => table := X"27"; 
 when X"9f" => table := X"25"; 
 when X"a0" => table := X"5b"; 
 when X"a1" => table := X"59"; 
 when X"a2" => table := X"5f"; 
 when X"a3" => table := X"5d"; 
 when X"a4" => table := X"53"; 
 when X"a5" => table := X"51"; 
 when X"a6" => table := X"57"; 
 when X"a7" => table := X"55"; 
 when X"a8" => table := X"4b"; 
 when X"a9" => table := X"49"; 
 when X"aa" => table := X"4f"; 
 when X"ab" => table := X"4d"; 
 when X"ac" => table := X"43"; 
 when X"ad" => table := X"41"; 
 when X"ae" => table := X"47"; 
 when X"af" => table := X"45"; 
 when X"b0" => table := X"7b"; 
 when X"b1" => table := X"79"; 
 when X"b2" => table := X"7f"; 
 when X"b3" => table := X"7d"; 
 when X"b4" => table := X"73"; 
 when X"b5" => table := X"71"; 
 when X"b6" => table := X"77"; 
 when X"b7" => table := X"75"; 
 when X"b8" => table := X"6b"; 
 when X"b9" => table := X"69"; 
 when X"ba" => table := X"6f"; 
 when X"bb" => table := X"6d"; 
 when X"bc" => table := X"63"; 
 when X"bd" => table := X"61"; 
 when X"be" => table := X"67"; 
 when X"bf" => table := X"65"; 
 when X"c0" => table := X"9b"; 
 when X"c1" => table := X"99"; 
 when X"c2" => table := X"9f"; 
 when X"c3" => table := X"9d"; 
 when X"c4" => table := X"93"; 
 when X"c5" => table := X"91"; 
 when X"c6" => table := X"97"; 
 when X"c7" => table := X"95"; 
 when X"c8" => table := X"8b"; 
 when X"c9" => table := X"89"; 
 when X"ca" => table := X"8f"; 
 when X"cb" => table := X"8d"; 
 when X"cc" => table := X"83"; 
 when X"cd" => table := X"81"; 
 when X"ce" => table := X"87"; 
 when X"cf" => table := X"85"; 
 when X"d0" => table := X"bb"; 
 when X"d1" => table := X"b9"; 
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 when X"d2" => table := X"bf"; 
 when X"d3" => table := X"bd"; 
 when X"d4" => table := X"b3"; 
 when X"d5" => table := X"b1"; 
 when X"d6" => table := X"b7"; 
 when X"d7" => table := X"b5"; 
 when X"d8" => table := X"ab"; 
 when X"d9" => table := X"a9"; 
 when X"da" => table := X"af"; 
 when X"db" => table := X"ad"; 
 when X"dc" => table := X"a3"; 
 when X"dd" => table := X"a1"; 
 when X"de" => table := X"a7"; 
 when X"df" => table := X"a5"; 
 when X"e0" => table := X"db"; 
 when X"e1" => table := X"d9"; 
 when X"e2" => table := X"df"; 
 when X"e3" => table := X"dd"; 
 when X"e4" => table := X"d3"; 
 when X"e5" => table := X"d1"; 
 when X"e6" => table := X"d7"; 
 when X"e7" => table := X"d5"; 
 when X"e8" => table := X"cb"; 
 when X"e9" => table := X"c9"; 
 when X"ea" => table := X"cf"; 
 when X"eb" => table := X"cd"; 
 when X"ec" => table := X"c3"; 
 when X"ed" => table := X"c1"; 
 when X"ee" => table := X"c7"; 
 when X"ef" => table := X"c5"; 
 when X"f0" => table := X"fb"; 
 when X"f1" => table := X"f9"; 
 when X"f2" => table := X"ff"; 
 when X"f3" => table := X"fd"; 
 when X"f4" => table := X"f3"; 
 when X"f5" => table := X"f1"; 
 when X"f6" => table := X"f7"; 
 when X"f7" => table := X"f5"; 
 when X"f8" => table := X"eb"; 
 when X"f9" => table := X"e9"; 
 when X"fa" => table := X"ef"; 
 when X"fb" => table := X"ed"; 
 when X"fc" => table := X"e3"; 
 when X"fd" => table := X"e1"; 
 when X"fe" => table := X"e7"; 
 when X"ff" => table := X"e5"; 
 when others => null;   
end case; 
table_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(table); 
return table_stdlogic; 
end function xtimes; 
 
--Processing step for encryption 
function col_transform(p: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector is 
 variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
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 variable m,n: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 begin  
 m := xtimes(p(0)); 
 n := xtimes(p(1)) xor p(1); 
   result := m xor n xor p(2) xor p(3); 
   return result; 
end function col_transform; 
 
--Preprocessing step for decryption 
function col_inv_transform(s: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector 
is 
variable u: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable v: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable prep: state_array_type; 
begin 
 
 u := xtimes(xtimes(s(0) xor s(2))); 
 v := xtimes(xtimes(s(1) xor s(3))); 
 prep(0) := s(0) xor u; 
 prep(1) := s(1) xor v; 
 prep(2) := s(2) xor u; 
 prep(3) := s(3) xor v; 
 result := col_transform(prep); 
 return result; 














MixColumns Half LUT 
function xtimes(inp: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0)) return 
std_logic_vector is 
variable table: bit_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable table_stdlogic: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
 
--replaces half of xtime LUT with a bitwise shift 
if inp < X"80" then 
  table_stdlogic := (inp(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
else 
 
--the other half of the LUT 
case inp is 
 when X"80" => table := X"1b"; 
 when X"81" => table := X"19"; 
 when X"82" => table := X"1f"; 
 when X"83" => table := X"1d"; 
 when X"84" => table := X"13"; 
 when X"85" => table := X"11"; 
 when X"86" => table := X"17"; 
 when X"87" => table := X"15"; 
 when X"88" => table := X"0b"; 
 when X"89" => table := X"09"; 
 when X"8a" => table := X"0f"; 
 when X"8b" => table := X"0d"; 
 when X"8c" => table := X"03"; 
 when X"8d" => table := X"01"; 
 when X"8e" => table := X"07"; 
 when X"8f" => table := X"05"; 
 when X"90" => table := X"3b"; 
 when X"91" => table := X"39"; 
 when X"92" => table := X"3f"; 
 when X"93" => table := X"3d"; 
 when X"94" => table := X"33"; 
 when X"95" => table := X"31"; 
 when X"96" => table := X"37"; 
 when X"97" => table := X"35"; 
 when X"98" => table := X"2b"; 
 when X"99" => table := X"29"; 
 when X"9a" => table := X"2f"; 
 when X"9b" => table := X"2d"; 
 when X"9c" => table := X"23"; 
 when X"9d" => table := X"21"; 
 when X"9e" => table := X"27"; 
 when X"9f" => table := X"25"; 
 when X"a0" => table := X"5b"; 
 when X"a1" => table := X"59"; 
 when X"a2" => table := X"5f"; 
 when X"a3" => table := X"5d"; 
 when X"a4" => table := X"53"; 
 when X"a5" => table := X"51"; 
 when X"a6" => table := X"57"; 
 when X"a7" => table := X"55"; 
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 when X"a8" => table := X"4b"; 
 when X"a9" => table := X"49"; 
 when X"aa" => table := X"4f"; 
 when X"ab" => table := X"4d"; 
 when X"ac" => table := X"43"; 
 when X"ad" => table := X"41"; 
 when X"ae" => table := X"47"; 
 when X"af" => table := X"45"; 
 when X"b0" => table := X"7b"; 
 when X"b1" => table := X"79"; 
 when X"b2" => table := X"7f"; 
 when X"b3" => table := X"7d"; 
 when X"b4" => table := X"73"; 
 when X"b5" => table := X"71"; 
 when X"b6" => table := X"77"; 
 when X"b7" => table := X"75"; 
 when X"b8" => table := X"6b"; 
 when X"b9" => table := X"69"; 
 when X"ba" => table := X"6f"; 
 when X"bb" => table := X"6d"; 
 when X"bc" => table := X"63"; 
 when X"bd" => table := X"61"; 
 when X"be" => table := X"67"; 
 when X"bf" => table := X"65"; 
 when X"c0" => table := X"9b"; 
 when X"c1" => table := X"99"; 
 when X"c2" => table := X"9f"; 
 when X"c3" => table := X"9d"; 
 when X"c4" => table := X"93"; 
 when X"c5" => table := X"91"; 
 when X"c6" => table := X"97"; 
 when X"c7" => table := X"95"; 
 when X"c8" => table := X"8b"; 
 when X"c9" => table := X"89"; 
 when X"ca" => table := X"8f"; 
 when X"cb" => table := X"8d"; 
 when X"cc" => table := X"83"; 
 when X"cd" => table := X"81"; 
 when X"ce" => table := X"87"; 
 when X"cf" => table := X"85"; 
 when X"d0" => table := X"bb"; 
 when X"d1" => table := X"b9"; 
 when X"d2" => table := X"bf"; 
 when X"d3" => table := X"bd"; 
 when X"d4" => table := X"b3"; 
 when X"d5" => table := X"b1"; 
 when X"d6" => table := X"b7"; 
 when X"d7" => table := X"b5"; 
 when X"d8" => table := X"ab"; 
 when X"d9" => table := X"a9"; 
 when X"da" => table := X"af"; 
 when X"db" => table := X"ad"; 
 when X"dc" => table := X"a3"; 
 when X"dd" => table := X"a1"; 
 when X"de" => table := X"a7"; 
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 when X"df" => table := X"a5"; 
 when X"e0" => table := X"db"; 
 when X"e1" => table := X"d9"; 
 when X"e2" => table := X"df"; 
 when X"e3" => table := X"dd"; 
 when X"e4" => table := X"d3"; 
 when X"e5" => table := X"d1"; 
 when X"e6" => table := X"d7"; 
 when X"e7" => table := X"d5"; 
 when X"e8" => table := X"cb"; 
 when X"e9" => table := X"c9"; 
 when X"ea" => table := X"cf"; 
 when X"eb" => table := X"cd"; 
 when X"ec" => table := X"c3"; 
 when X"ed" => table := X"c1"; 
 when X"ee" => table := X"c7"; 
 when X"ef" => table := X"c5"; 
 when X"f0" => table := X"fb"; 
 when X"f1" => table := X"f9"; 
 when X"f2" => table := X"ff"; 
 when X"f3" => table := X"fd"; 
 when X"f4" => table := X"f3"; 
 when X"f5" => table := X"f1"; 
 when X"f6" => table := X"f7"; 
 when X"f7" => table := X"f5"; 
 when X"f8" => table := X"eb"; 
 when X"f9" => table := X"e9"; 
 when X"fa" => table := X"ef"; 
 when X"fb" => table := X"ed"; 
 when X"fc" => table := X"e3"; 
 when X"fd" => table := X"e1"; 
 when X"fe" => table := X"e7"; 
 when X"ff" => table := X"e5"; 
 when others => null;   
end case; 
table_stdlogic := to_StdLogicVector(table); 
end if; 
return table_stdlogic; 
end function xtimes; 
 
--Processing step for encryption 
function col_transform(p: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector is 
 variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 variable m,n: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 begin  
 m := xtimes(p(0)); 
 n := xtimes(p(1)) xor p(1); 
   result := m xor n xor p(2) xor p(3); 
   return result; 
end function col_transform; 
 
--Preprocessing step for decryption 
function col_inv_transform(s: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector 
is 
variable u: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
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variable v: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable prep: state_array_type; 
begin 
 
 u := xtimes(xtimes(s(0) xor s(2))); 
 v := xtimes(xtimes(s(1) xor s(3))); 
 prep(0) := s(0) xor u; 
 prep(1) := s(1) xor v; 
 prep(2) := s(2) xor u; 
 prep(3) := s(3) xor v; 
 result := col_transform(prep); 
 return result; 
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--Uses Trenholme’s Algorithm to compute modulus for encryption 
function col_transform(p: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector is 
 variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 variable m,n: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
 begin  
   if(p(0)(7) = '1') then 
     m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
   else 
     m := (p(0)(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
   end if; 
   if(p(1)(7) = '1') then 
     n := (p(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011" xor p(1); 
   else 
     n := (p(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor p(1); 
   end if; 
   result := m xor n xor p(2) xor p(3); 
   return result; 
end function col_transform; 
 
--Uses Trenholme’s Algorithm to compute modulus values for decryption 
function col_inv_transform(s: state_array_type) return std_logic_vector 
is 
variable result: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable sub0,sub1,sub2,sub3: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable x0,y0,z0: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable x1,y1,z1: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable x2,y2,z2: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
variable x3,y3,z3: std_logic_vector(7 downto 0); 
begin 
  if(s(0)(7) = '1') then 
    x0 := (s(0)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    x0 := (s(0)(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  if(x0(7) = '1') then 
    y0 := (x0(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    y0 := (x0(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  if(y0(7) = '1') then 
    z0 := (y0(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    z0 := (y0(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  sub0 := (x0 xor y0 xor z0);---------- 
 
  if(s(1)(7) = '1') then 
    x1 := (s(1)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    x1 := (s(1)(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
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  if(x1(7) = '1') then 
    y1 := (x1(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    y1 := (x1(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  if(y1(7) = '1') then 
    z1 := (y1(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    z1 := (y1(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  sub1 := (x1 xor z1 xor s(1));---------- 
 
  if(s(2)(7) = '1') then 
    x2 := (s(2)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    x2 := (s(2)(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  if(x2(7) = '1') then 
    y2 := (x2(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    y2 := (x2(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  if(y2(7) = '1') then 
    z2 := (y2(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    z2 := (y2(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  sub2 := (y2 xor z2 xor s(2));---------- 
 
  if(s(3)(7) = '1') then 
    x3 := (s(3)(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    x3 := (s(3)(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  if(x3(7) = '1') then 
    y3 := (x3(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    y3 := (x3(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  if(y3(7) = '1') then 
    z3 := (y3(6 downto 0) & '0') xor "00011011"; 
  else 
    z3 := (y3(6 downto 0) & '0'); 
  end if; 
  sub3 := (z3 xor s(3));---------- 
   
  result := sub0 xor sub1 xor sub2 xor sub3; 
  return result; 




Appendix C: Statistical Data Tables 
Table 25. Analysis of Variance Table for Area Occupied  
 
Source                              DF       Seq SS       Adj SS      Adj MS 
SubBytes Design                      2  13700255055  13700255055  6850127527 
MixColumns Design                    2  15902640562  15902640562  7951320281 
Synthesis Goal                       1    550544684    550544684   550544684 
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design    4    150371320    150371320    37592830 
SubBytes Design*Synthesis Goal       2     37100094     37100094    18550047 
MixColumns Design*Synthesis Goal     2      5430919      5430919     2715460 
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design*   4    196245452    196245452    49061363 
  Synthesis Goal 
Error                                0            *            *           * 
Total                               17  30542588085 
 
 
S = * 
 
Table 26. Quantification of Effects for Area Occupied 
                                                                SE 
Term                                             Coef  Coef  T  P 
Constant                                      81053.8     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des 
Composite Field Inversion                    -26670.3     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion                     -11326.8     *  *  * 
MixColumns D 
Arithmetic                                   -21268.4     *  *  * 
Half LUT                                     -20765.8     *  *  * 
Synthesis Go 
Area                                         -5530.44     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D 
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic         -1314.56     *  *  * 
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT           -2135.22     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic          -889.056     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT            -1350.22     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des*Synthesis Go 
Composite Field Inversion Area                1156.94     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Area                 866.444     *  *  * 
MixColumns D*Synthesis Go 
Arithmetic   Area                             743.111     *  *  * 
Half LUT     Area                            -567.556     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D*Synthesis Go 
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic   Area   1457.89     *  *  * 
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT     Area   2507.56     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic   Area    1201.39     *  *  * 







Table 27. Analysis of Variance Table for Area Efficiency  
 
Source                              DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS   F  P 
SubBytes Design                      2  257.976  257.976  128.988  ** 
MixColumns Design                    2  409.585  409.585  204.792  ** 
Synthesis Goal                       1   20.278   20.278   20.278  ** 
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design    4   81.639   81.639   20.410  ** 
SubBytes Design*Synthesis Goal       2    7.496    7.496    3.748  ** 
MixColumns Design*Synthesis Goal     2    6.390    6.390    3.195  ** 
SubBytes Design*MixColumns Design*   4    2.710    2.710    0.677  ** 
  Synthesis Goal 
Error                                0        *        *        * 
Total                               17  786.074 
 
 
S = * 
 
Table 28. Quantification of Effects for Area Efficiency 
 
                                                           SE    SE 
Term                                              Coef  Coef  T  P 
Constant                                       11.0028     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des 
Composite Field Inversion                      3.45900     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion                       1.80950     *  *  * 
MixColumns D 
Arithmetic                                     3.16817     *  *  * 
Half LUT                                       3.57383     *  *  * 
Synthesis Go 
Area                                          -1.06139     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D 
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic           1.37900     *  *  * 
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT             1.61733     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic           0.402500     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Half LUT             0.706833     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des*Synthesis Go 
Composite Field Inversion Area               -0.853444     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Area                 0.706722     *  *  * 
MixColumns D*Synthesis Go 
Arithmetic   Area                            -0.720944     *  *  * 
Half LUT     Area                            -0.017278     *  *  * 
SubBytes Des*MixColumns D*Synthesis Go 
Composite Field Inversion Arithmetic   Area  -0.319222     *  *  * 
Composite Field Inversion Half LUT     Area  -0.447889     *  *  * 
Extended Field Inversion Arithmetic   Area    0.091611     *  *  * 
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